Why do people, and corporations, give money to candidates? The canonical answer, adopted by the Supreme Court, is that “money is speech” and that the donation of money is, in effect, speech in support of a particular political viewpoint. On this view, giving a candidate $100 is the same as standing up in a town hall and saying “I support Candidate Smith.”
There are good reasons to doubt this legal fiction, but even if we grant the premise and assume that “money is speech,” we all know that even then, the premise is only partially true. Even conceding that sometimes money is intended to fund the advancement of a favored idea, there is no blinking the reality that money is often given with another purpose in mind – to buy influence. Money may be speech, but it is also access, persuasion, coaxing, enticement, and clout. And, frankly, it is this latter aspect of money that makes its use in politics particularly problematic – if we could have funding without influence that would be a substantial step in the right direction.
So, what if we could preserve the constitutionally protected aspects of money – supportive political expression – and eliminate the unprotected, unsavory aspects of vote-buying and influence peddling? What if there were a way to, metaphorically, split the baby in half?
Perhaps there is. Here’s one idea – anonymous money. Make it a rule that you can give all the money you want to a candidate or an issue of your choosing. But you can only do so anonymously. Assuming you could design such a system (about which more below) it would cut off the connection between money and access.
A donor could give all the money he or she wanted – but the claim that he or she had done so would be unverifiable. If you couldn’t somehow prove that the money Candidate Smith just received was from you, then Smith would have no basis for granting you special access – and anyone could claim such largess, even if they had not contributed a dime. This system would let a donor “speak” all they wanted in favor of whoever or whatever they wanted. But they could not, at the same time, claim the “credit” for the funds (and thus they would be deprived of the influence that the credit may bring them).
To be sure, the concept is a bit creative, but it is not impossible to imagine a way in which it might work. Perhaps in an earlier time, the recordkeeping necessary would have prevented any attempt at anonymity or made it extremely difficult to execute. Today, however, a technological solution seems available.
As a general matter cryptocurrencies are intended to be pseudonymous. Users who value their privacy have developed a system to enhance that pseudonymity to near-guaranteed anonymity through the use of a system known as a “mixer.” Mixers are a service that mixes one user’s cryptocurrency with that of many others, obscuring the transaction trail, and then distributing funds from the mixed currency to designated recipients. If the number of cryptocurrency coins mixed is sufficiently large, the transaction trail can become effectively impractical to untangle.
Today, crypto transactions use mixers for any number of reasons. Some, like protection from oppressive regimes, are beneficent. Others, like obscuring criminal transactions, much less so. But whether for good or ill the technology is reasonably effective in achieving its objective of practical obscurity.
While normally it is the parties to the transaction who value anonymity, one can imagine that society at large might do so as well, and create a legal system that mandates all political donations be made through a cryptocurrency mixer. Doing so would irrevocably break the connection between donor and political recipient.
Enforcement would be a challenge – we would need, for example, to prohibit all non-crypto donations and criminalize out-of-channel communications that sought to reidentify donations. But at least in theory a system of anonymous money is possible.
We can’t predict what the result of adopting this system would be. Perhaps donors who feel they must buy influence would feel liberated and access donations would dry up. Perhaps true speech donations would flourish. One suspects, however, that either way the political system would, on the whole, be better off.
Why do people, and corporations, give money to candidates? The canonical answer, adopted by the Supreme Court, is that “money is speech” and that the donation of money is, in effect, speech in support of a particular political viewpoint. On this view, giving a candidate $100 is the same as standing up in a town hall and saying “I support Candidate Smith.”
There are good reasons to doubt this legal fiction, but even if we grant the premise and assume that “money is speech,” we all know that even then, the premise is only partially true. Even conceding that sometimes money is intended to fund the advancement of a favored idea, there is no blinking the reality that money is often given with another purpose in mind – to buy influence. Money may be speech, but it is also access, persuasion, coaxing, enticement, and clout. And, frankly, it is this latter aspect of money that makes its use in politics particularly problematic – if we could have funding without influence that would be a substantial step in the right direction.
So, what if we could preserve the constitutionally protected aspects of money – supportive political expression – and eliminate the unprotected, unsavory aspects of vote-buying and influence peddling? What if there were a way to, metaphorically, split the baby in half?
Perhaps there is. Here’s one idea – anonymous money. Make it a rule that you can give all the money you want to a candidate or an issue of your choosing. But you can only do so anonymously. Assuming you could design such a system (about which more below) it would cut off the connection between money and access.
A donor could give all the money he or she wanted – but the claim that he or she had done so would be unverifiable. If you couldn’t somehow prove that the money Candidate Smith just received was from you, then Smith would have no basis for granting you special access – and anyone could claim such largess, even if they had not contributed a dime. This system would let a donor “speak” all they wanted in favor of whoever or whatever they wanted. But they could not, at the same time, claim the “credit” for the funds (and thus they would be deprived of the influence that the credit may bring them).
To be sure, the concept is a bit creative, but it is not impossible to imagine a way in which it might work. Perhaps in an earlier time, the recordkeeping necessary would have prevented any attempt at anonymity or made it extremely difficult to execute. Today, however, a technological solution seems available.
As a general matter cryptocurrencies are intended to be pseudonymous. Users who value their privacy have developed a system to enhance that pseudonymity to near-guaranteed anonymity through the use of a system known as a “mixer.” Mixers are a service that mixes one user’s cryptocurrency with that of many others, obscuring the transaction trail, and then distributing funds from the mixed currency to designated recipients. If the number of cryptocurrency coins mixed is sufficiently large, the transaction trail can become effectively impractical to untangle.
Today, crypto transactions use mixers for any number of reasons. Some, like protection from oppressive regimes, are beneficent. Others, like obscuring criminal transactions, much less so. But whether for good or ill the technology is reasonably effective in achieving its objective of practical obscurity.
While normally it is the parties to the transaction who value anonymity, one can imagine that society at large might do so as well, and create a legal system that mandates all political donations be made through a cryptocurrency mixer. Doing so would irrevocably break the connection between donor and political recipient.
Enforcement would be a challenge – we would need, for example, to prohibit all non-crypto donations and criminalize out-of-channel communications that sought to reidentify donations. But at least in theory a system of anonymous money is possible.
We can’t predict what the result of adopting this system would be. Perhaps donors who feel they must buy influence would feel liberated and access donations would dry up. Perhaps true speech donations would flourish. One suspects, however, that either way the political system would, on the whole, be better off.
Why do people, and corporations, give money to candidates? The canonical answer, adopted by the Supreme Court, is that “money is speech” and that the donation of money is, in effect, speech in support of a particular political viewpoint. On this view, giving a candidate $100 is the same as standing up in a town hall and saying “I support Candidate Smith.”
There are good reasons to doubt this legal fiction, but even if we grant the premise and assume that “money is speech,” we all know that even then, the premise is only partially true. Even conceding that sometimes money is intended to fund the advancement of a favored idea, there is no blinking the reality that money is often given with another purpose in mind – to buy influence. Money may be speech, but it is also access, persuasion, coaxing, enticement, and clout. And, frankly, it is this latter aspect of money that makes its use in politics particularly problematic – if we could have funding without influence that would be a substantial step in the right direction.
So, what if we could preserve the constitutionally protected aspects of money – supportive political expression – and eliminate the unprotected, unsavory aspects of vote-buying and influence peddling? What if there were a way to, metaphorically, split the baby in half?
Perhaps there is. Here’s one idea – anonymous money. Make it a rule that you can give all the money you want to a candidate or an issue of your choosing. But you can only do so anonymously. Assuming you could design such a system (about which more below) it would cut off the connection between money and access.
A donor could give all the money he or she wanted – but the claim that he or she had done so would be unverifiable. If you couldn’t somehow prove that the money Candidate Smith just received was from you, then Smith would have no basis for granting you special access – and anyone could claim such largess, even if they had not contributed a dime. This system would let a donor “speak” all they wanted in favor of whoever or whatever they wanted. But they could not, at the same time, claim the “credit” for the funds (and thus they would be deprived of the influence that the credit may bring them).
To be sure, the concept is a bit creative, but it is not impossible to imagine a way in which it might work. Perhaps in an earlier time, the recordkeeping necessary would have prevented any attempt at anonymity or made it extremely difficult to execute. Today, however, a technological solution seems available.
As a general matter cryptocurrencies are intended to be pseudonymous. Users who value their privacy have developed a system to enhance that pseudonymity to near-guaranteed anonymity through the use of a system known as a “mixer.” Mixers are a service that mixes one user’s cryptocurrency with that of many others, obscuring the transaction trail, and then distributing funds from the mixed currency to designated recipients. If the number of cryptocurrency coins mixed is sufficiently large, the transaction trail can become effectively impractical to untangle.
Today, crypto transactions use mixers for any number of reasons. Some, like protection from oppressive regimes, are beneficent. Others, like obscuring criminal transactions, much less so. But whether for good or ill the technology is reasonably effective in achieving its objective of practical obscurity.
While normally it is the parties to the transaction who value anonymity, one can imagine that society at large might do so as well, and create a legal system that mandates all political donations be made through a cryptocurrency mixer. Doing so would irrevocably break the connection between donor and political recipient.
Enforcement would be a challenge – we would need, for example, to prohibit all non-crypto donations and criminalize out-of-channel communications that sought to reidentify donations. But at least in theory a system of anonymous money is possible.
We can’t predict what the result of adopting this system would be. Perhaps donors who feel they must buy influence would feel liberated and access donations would dry up. Perhaps true speech donations would flourish. One suspects, however, that either way the political system would, on the whole, be better off.
Why do people, and corporations, give money to candidates? The canonical answer, adopted by the Supreme Court, is that “money is speech” and that the donation of money is, in effect, speech in support of a particular political viewpoint. On this view, giving a candidate $100 is the same as standing up in a town hall and saying “I support Candidate Smith.”
There are good reasons to doubt this legal fiction, but even if we grant the premise and assume that “money is speech,” we all know that even then, the premise is only partially true. Even conceding that sometimes money is intended to fund the advancement of a favored idea, there is no blinking the reality that money is often given with another purpose in mind – to buy influence. Money may be speech, but it is also access, persuasion, coaxing, enticement, and clout. And, frankly, it is this latter aspect of money that makes its use in politics particularly problematic – if we could have funding without influence that would be a substantial step in the right direction.
So, what if we could preserve the constitutionally protected aspects of money – supportive political expression – and eliminate the unprotected, unsavory aspects of vote-buying and influence peddling? What if there were a way to, metaphorically, split the baby in half?
Perhaps there is. Here’s one idea – anonymous money. Make it a rule that you can give all the money you want to a candidate or an issue of your choosing. But you can only do so anonymously. Assuming you could design such a system (about which more below) it would cut off the connection between money and access.
A donor could give all the money he or she wanted – but the claim that he or she had done so would be unverifiable. If you couldn’t somehow prove that the money Candidate Smith just received was from you, then Smith would have no basis for granting you special access – and anyone could claim such largess, even if they had not contributed a dime. This system would let a donor “speak” all they wanted in favor of whoever or whatever they wanted. But they could not, at the same time, claim the “credit” for the funds (and thus they would be deprived of the influence that the credit may bring them).
To be sure, the concept is a bit creative, but it is not impossible to imagine a way in which it might work. Perhaps in an earlier time, the recordkeeping necessary would have prevented any attempt at anonymity or made it extremely difficult to execute. Today, however, a technological solution seems available.
As a general matter cryptocurrencies are intended to be pseudonymous. Users who value their privacy have developed a system to enhance that pseudonymity to near-guaranteed anonymity through the use of a system known as a “mixer.” Mixers are a service that mixes one user’s cryptocurrency with that of many others, obscuring the transaction trail, and then distributing funds from the mixed currency to designated recipients. If the number of cryptocurrency coins mixed is sufficiently large, the transaction trail can become effectively impractical to untangle.
Today, crypto transactions use mixers for any number of reasons. Some, like protection from oppressive regimes, are beneficent. Others, like obscuring criminal transactions, much less so. But whether for good or ill the technology is reasonably effective in achieving its objective of practical obscurity.
While normally it is the parties to the transaction who value anonymity, one can imagine that society at large might do so as well, and create a legal system that mandates all political donations be made through a cryptocurrency mixer. Doing so would irrevocably break the connection between donor and political recipient.
Enforcement would be a challenge – we would need, for example, to prohibit all non-crypto donations and criminalize out-of-channel communications that sought to reidentify donations. But at least in theory a system of anonymous money is possible.
We can’t predict what the result of adopting this system would be. Perhaps donors who feel they must buy influence would feel liberated and access donations would dry up. Perhaps true speech donations would flourish. One suspects, however, that either way the political system would, on the whole, be better off.
Why do people, and corporations, give money to candidates? The canonical answer, adopted by the Supreme Court, is that “money is speech” and that the donation of money is, in effect, speech in support of a particular political viewpoint. On this view, giving a candidate $100 is the same as standing up in a town hall and saying “I support Candidate Smith.”
There are good reasons to doubt this legal fiction, but even if we grant the premise and assume that “money is speech,” we all know that even then, the premise is only partially true. Even conceding that sometimes money is intended to fund the advancement of a favored idea, there is no blinking the reality that money is often given with another purpose in mind – to buy influence. Money may be speech, but it is also access, persuasion, coaxing, enticement, and clout. And, frankly, it is this latter aspect of money that makes its use in politics particularly problematic – if we could have funding without influence that would be a substantial step in the right direction.
So, what if we could preserve the constitutionally protected aspects of money – supportive political expression – and eliminate the unprotected, unsavory aspects of vote-buying and influence peddling? What if there were a way to, metaphorically, split the baby in half?
Perhaps there is. Here’s one idea – anonymous money. Make it a rule that you can give all the money you want to a candidate or an issue of your choosing. But you can only do so anonymously. Assuming you could design such a system (about which more below) it would cut off the connection between money and access.
A donor could give all the money he or she wanted – but the claim that he or she had done so would be unverifiable. If you couldn’t somehow prove that the money Candidate Smith just received was from you, then Smith would have no basis for granting you special access – and anyone could claim such largess, even if they had not contributed a dime. This system would let a donor “speak” all they wanted in favor of whoever or whatever they wanted. But they could not, at the same time, claim the “credit” for the funds (and thus they would be deprived of the influence that the credit may bring them).
To be sure, the concept is a bit creative, but it is not impossible to imagine a way in which it might work. Perhaps in an earlier time, the recordkeeping necessary would have prevented any attempt at anonymity or made it extremely difficult to execute. Today, however, a technological solution seems available.
As a general matter cryptocurrencies are intended to be pseudonymous. Users who value their privacy have developed a system to enhance that pseudonymity to near-guaranteed anonymity through the use of a system known as a “mixer.” Mixers are a service that mixes one user’s cryptocurrency with that of many others, obscuring the transaction trail, and then distributing funds from the mixed currency to designated recipients. If the number of cryptocurrency coins mixed is sufficiently large, the transaction trail can become effectively impractical to untangle.
Today, crypto transactions use mixers for any number of reasons. Some, like protection from oppressive regimes, are beneficent. Others, like obscuring criminal transactions, much less so. But whether for good or ill the technology is reasonably effective in achieving its objective of practical obscurity.
While normally it is the parties to the transaction who value anonymity, one can imagine that society at large might do so as well, and create a legal system that mandates all political donations be made through a cryptocurrency mixer. Doing so would irrevocably break the connection between donor and political recipient.
Enforcement would be a challenge – we would need, for example, to prohibit all non-crypto donations and criminalize out-of-channel communications that sought to reidentify donations. But at least in theory a system of anonymous money is possible.
We can’t predict what the result of adopting this system would be. Perhaps donors who feel they must buy influence would feel liberated and access donations would dry up. Perhaps true speech donations would flourish. One suspects, however, that either way the political system would, on the whole, be better off.
Why do people, and corporations, give money to candidates? The canonical answer, adopted by the Supreme Court, is that “money is speech” and that the donation of money is, in effect, speech in support of a particular political viewpoint. On this view, giving a candidate $100 is the same as standing up in a town hall and saying “I support Candidate Smith.”
There are good reasons to doubt this legal fiction, but even if we grant the premise and assume that “money is speech,” we all know that even then, the premise is only partially true. Even conceding that sometimes money is intended to fund the advancement of a favored idea, there is no blinking the reality that money is often given with another purpose in mind – to buy influence. Money may be speech, but it is also access, persuasion, coaxing, enticement, and clout. And, frankly, it is this latter aspect of money that makes its use in politics particularly problematic – if we could have funding without influence that would be a substantial step in the right direction.
So, what if we could preserve the constitutionally protected aspects of money – supportive political expression – and eliminate the unprotected, unsavory aspects of vote-buying and influence peddling? What if there were a way to, metaphorically, split the baby in half?
Perhaps there is. Here’s one idea – anonymous money. Make it a rule that you can give all the money you want to a candidate or an issue of your choosing. But you can only do so anonymously. Assuming you could design such a system (about which more below) it would cut off the connection between money and access.
A donor could give all the money he or she wanted – but the claim that he or she had done so would be unverifiable. If you couldn’t somehow prove that the money Candidate Smith just received was from you, then Smith would have no basis for granting you special access – and anyone could claim such largess, even if they had not contributed a dime. This system would let a donor “speak” all they wanted in favor of whoever or whatever they wanted. But they could not, at the same time, claim the “credit” for the funds (and thus they would be deprived of the influence that the credit may bring them).
To be sure, the concept is a bit creative, but it is not impossible to imagine a way in which it might work. Perhaps in an earlier time, the recordkeeping necessary would have prevented any attempt at anonymity or made it extremely difficult to execute. Today, however, a technological solution seems available.
As a general matter cryptocurrencies are intended to be pseudonymous. Users who value their privacy have developed a system to enhance that pseudonymity to near-guaranteed anonymity through the use of a system known as a “mixer.” Mixers are a service that mixes one user’s cryptocurrency with that of many others, obscuring the transaction trail, and then distributing funds from the mixed currency to designated recipients. If the number of cryptocurrency coins mixed is sufficiently large, the transaction trail can become effectively impractical to untangle.
Today, crypto transactions use mixers for any number of reasons. Some, like protection from oppressive regimes, are beneficent. Others, like obscuring criminal transactions, much less so. But whether for good or ill the technology is reasonably effective in achieving its objective of practical obscurity.
While normally it is the parties to the transaction who value anonymity, one can imagine that society at large might do so as well, and create a legal system that mandates all political donations be made through a cryptocurrency mixer. Doing so would irrevocably break the connection between donor and political recipient.
Enforcement would be a challenge – we would need, for example, to prohibit all non-crypto donations and criminalize out-of-channel communications that sought to reidentify donations. But at least in theory a system of anonymous money is possible.
We can’t predict what the result of adopting this system would be. Perhaps donors who feel they must buy influence would feel liberated and access donations would dry up. Perhaps true speech donations would flourish. One suspects, however, that either way the political system would, on the whole, be better off.
About the Author
Paul Rosenzweig
Paul Rosenzweig is the founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company. He formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security. Rosenzweig is a Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University, an advisor to and former member of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security, and a Contributing Editor of the Lawfare blog.
About the Author
Paul Rosenzweig
Paul Rosenzweig is the founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company. He formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security. Rosenzweig is a Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University, an advisor to and former member of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security, and a Contributing Editor of the Lawfare blog.
About the Author
Paul Rosenzweig
Paul Rosenzweig is the founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company. He formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security. Rosenzweig is a Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University, an advisor to and former member of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security, and a Contributing Editor of the Lawfare blog.
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