Why have single-district representation in the first place? Without a districting requirement, we would not have congressional districts carved up into cartoon-like configurations.
When adopted by the British Parliament, geographic districting was thought to allow localities with distinct economic, social, and cultural interests to have direct representation. It was also, before the advent of the gerrymander, administratively convenient, linking counties and towns with clear boundaries into easily mapped venues.
Neither of those reasons applies to the modern gerrymander, whose very purpose is to disaggregate communities with distinctive social interests to diminish their power through the creation of bizarrely drawn districts. Which leads one to ask – are congressional districts mandatory? Do we have to live with a system where State legislatures rig the vote?
The surprising answer is that we don’t. Congress can, if it chooses, do away with congressional districts entirely and have Members of the House of Representatives elected on a statewide proportional basis.
The rule requiring single-member districts is a creature not of Constitutional mandate but of federal statute. Current law requires that individual representatives represent distinct districts. As 2. U.S.C. §2c provides: “In each State … there shall be established by law a number of districts . . . and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established . . . .”
But that is not inevitable. Indeed, there is existing precedent for Congress mandating a different style of election. Imagine, if you will, the following hypothetical: in the next decennial census, Texas gains another two seats in the House of Representatives. But, whether because of laxity or political disagreement, by the time the next federal election rolls around, Texas has still not adopted a redistricting plan. What then happens with respect to the two new Representatives?
The answer can be found in 2 U.S.C. §2a(c) – an existing, little-remarked-upon, provision of law. The statute provides that if no redistricting law has been passed, then “if there is an increase in the number of Representatives, such additional Representative or Representatives shall be elected from the State at large.”
In other words, Congress has the authority, exercised once already, to impose on the States the general format by which the States may elect Representatives. It may, as it has, require single-member district elections. But it may (as it also has) change that paradigm and require elections to be held at large. And if it has that power, then it likewise has the power to mandate that statewide at-large elections distribute seats on a proportional basis.
There is much to recommend this idea. For one thing, bereft of the security of gerrymandered districts, candidates would need to run more centrist campaigns that appealed to a broader electorate. Breaking the distorted district deadlock would incentivize more moderate positions and break the extremist wing's stranglehold.
For another, at-large proportionate districting would give value to every vote. As it stands today, millions of voters have their votes rendered meaningless by our first-past-the-post system. To cite a trivial example, the 6 million Trump voters in California were more than in any other state in the Union, save Texas and Florida, yet their votes were meaningless. This restructuring would give their votes meaning.
Would it have an immediate impact? Likely. The total vote in 2024 in the House of Representatives was roughly 74 million Republicans to 70 million Democrats. So the number of seats each party held would likely be the same. But imagine the change in the character of Representatives. One has to believe (or vainly hope) that a party candidate list headed by an extremist like Marjorie Taylor Greene would be less appealing to a broader statewide electorate than to those in her narrow purpose-built district.
Are there risks? Likewise, yes – if Congress can mandate proportional results, it can also mandate bullet voting and give all congressional seats to the state party with the most votes. And the political science literature is rife with essays on the dangers of proportional representation – a danger we see clearly around the globe.
But the current system of designing districts is badly broken, creating a deeply polarized legislature. Perhaps nothing can solve the problem, but it might be worth a try.
Why have single-district representation in the first place? Without a districting requirement, we would not have congressional districts carved up into cartoon-like configurations.
When adopted by the British Parliament, geographic districting was thought to allow localities with distinct economic, social, and cultural interests to have direct representation. It was also, before the advent of the gerrymander, administratively convenient, linking counties and towns with clear boundaries into easily mapped venues.
Neither of those reasons applies to the modern gerrymander, whose very purpose is to disaggregate communities with distinctive social interests to diminish their power through the creation of bizarrely drawn districts. Which leads one to ask – are congressional districts mandatory? Do we have to live with a system where State legislatures rig the vote?
The surprising answer is that we don’t. Congress can, if it chooses, do away with congressional districts entirely and have Members of the House of Representatives elected on a statewide proportional basis.
The rule requiring single-member districts is a creature not of Constitutional mandate but of federal statute. Current law requires that individual representatives represent distinct districts. As 2. U.S.C. §2c provides: “In each State … there shall be established by law a number of districts . . . and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established . . . .”
But that is not inevitable. Indeed, there is existing precedent for Congress mandating a different style of election. Imagine, if you will, the following hypothetical: in the next decennial census, Texas gains another two seats in the House of Representatives. But, whether because of laxity or political disagreement, by the time the next federal election rolls around, Texas has still not adopted a redistricting plan. What then happens with respect to the two new Representatives?
The answer can be found in 2 U.S.C. §2a(c) – an existing, little-remarked-upon, provision of law. The statute provides that if no redistricting law has been passed, then “if there is an increase in the number of Representatives, such additional Representative or Representatives shall be elected from the State at large.”
In other words, Congress has the authority, exercised once already, to impose on the States the general format by which the States may elect Representatives. It may, as it has, require single-member district elections. But it may (as it also has) change that paradigm and require elections to be held at large. And if it has that power, then it likewise has the power to mandate that statewide at-large elections distribute seats on a proportional basis.
There is much to recommend this idea. For one thing, bereft of the security of gerrymandered districts, candidates would need to run more centrist campaigns that appealed to a broader electorate. Breaking the distorted district deadlock would incentivize more moderate positions and break the extremist wing's stranglehold.
For another, at-large proportionate districting would give value to every vote. As it stands today, millions of voters have their votes rendered meaningless by our first-past-the-post system. To cite a trivial example, the 6 million Trump voters in California were more than in any other state in the Union, save Texas and Florida, yet their votes were meaningless. This restructuring would give their votes meaning.
Would it have an immediate impact? Likely. The total vote in 2024 in the House of Representatives was roughly 74 million Republicans to 70 million Democrats. So the number of seats each party held would likely be the same. But imagine the change in the character of Representatives. One has to believe (or vainly hope) that a party candidate list headed by an extremist like Marjorie Taylor Greene would be less appealing to a broader statewide electorate than to those in her narrow purpose-built district.
Are there risks? Likewise, yes – if Congress can mandate proportional results, it can also mandate bullet voting and give all congressional seats to the state party with the most votes. And the political science literature is rife with essays on the dangers of proportional representation – a danger we see clearly around the globe.
But the current system of designing districts is badly broken, creating a deeply polarized legislature. Perhaps nothing can solve the problem, but it might be worth a try.
Why have single-district representation in the first place? Without a districting requirement, we would not have congressional districts carved up into cartoon-like configurations.
When adopted by the British Parliament, geographic districting was thought to allow localities with distinct economic, social, and cultural interests to have direct representation. It was also, before the advent of the gerrymander, administratively convenient, linking counties and towns with clear boundaries into easily mapped venues.
Neither of those reasons applies to the modern gerrymander, whose very purpose is to disaggregate communities with distinctive social interests to diminish their power through the creation of bizarrely drawn districts. Which leads one to ask – are congressional districts mandatory? Do we have to live with a system where State legislatures rig the vote?
The surprising answer is that we don’t. Congress can, if it chooses, do away with congressional districts entirely and have Members of the House of Representatives elected on a statewide proportional basis.
The rule requiring single-member districts is a creature not of Constitutional mandate but of federal statute. Current law requires that individual representatives represent distinct districts. As 2. U.S.C. §2c provides: “In each State … there shall be established by law a number of districts . . . and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established . . . .”
But that is not inevitable. Indeed, there is existing precedent for Congress mandating a different style of election. Imagine, if you will, the following hypothetical: in the next decennial census, Texas gains another two seats in the House of Representatives. But, whether because of laxity or political disagreement, by the time the next federal election rolls around, Texas has still not adopted a redistricting plan. What then happens with respect to the two new Representatives?
The answer can be found in 2 U.S.C. §2a(c) – an existing, little-remarked-upon, provision of law. The statute provides that if no redistricting law has been passed, then “if there is an increase in the number of Representatives, such additional Representative or Representatives shall be elected from the State at large.”
In other words, Congress has the authority, exercised once already, to impose on the States the general format by which the States may elect Representatives. It may, as it has, require single-member district elections. But it may (as it also has) change that paradigm and require elections to be held at large. And if it has that power, then it likewise has the power to mandate that statewide at-large elections distribute seats on a proportional basis.
There is much to recommend this idea. For one thing, bereft of the security of gerrymandered districts, candidates would need to run more centrist campaigns that appealed to a broader electorate. Breaking the distorted district deadlock would incentivize more moderate positions and break the extremist wing's stranglehold.
For another, at-large proportionate districting would give value to every vote. As it stands today, millions of voters have their votes rendered meaningless by our first-past-the-post system. To cite a trivial example, the 6 million Trump voters in California were more than in any other state in the Union, save Texas and Florida, yet their votes were meaningless. This restructuring would give their votes meaning.
Would it have an immediate impact? Likely. The total vote in 2024 in the House of Representatives was roughly 74 million Republicans to 70 million Democrats. So the number of seats each party held would likely be the same. But imagine the change in the character of Representatives. One has to believe (or vainly hope) that a party candidate list headed by an extremist like Marjorie Taylor Greene would be less appealing to a broader statewide electorate than to those in her narrow purpose-built district.
Are there risks? Likewise, yes – if Congress can mandate proportional results, it can also mandate bullet voting and give all congressional seats to the state party with the most votes. And the political science literature is rife with essays on the dangers of proportional representation – a danger we see clearly around the globe.
But the current system of designing districts is badly broken, creating a deeply polarized legislature. Perhaps nothing can solve the problem, but it might be worth a try.
Why have single-district representation in the first place? Without a districting requirement, we would not have congressional districts carved up into cartoon-like configurations.
When adopted by the British Parliament, geographic districting was thought to allow localities with distinct economic, social, and cultural interests to have direct representation. It was also, before the advent of the gerrymander, administratively convenient, linking counties and towns with clear boundaries into easily mapped venues.
Neither of those reasons applies to the modern gerrymander, whose very purpose is to disaggregate communities with distinctive social interests to diminish their power through the creation of bizarrely drawn districts. Which leads one to ask – are congressional districts mandatory? Do we have to live with a system where State legislatures rig the vote?
The surprising answer is that we don’t. Congress can, if it chooses, do away with congressional districts entirely and have Members of the House of Representatives elected on a statewide proportional basis.
The rule requiring single-member districts is a creature not of Constitutional mandate but of federal statute. Current law requires that individual representatives represent distinct districts. As 2. U.S.C. §2c provides: “In each State … there shall be established by law a number of districts . . . and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established . . . .”
But that is not inevitable. Indeed, there is existing precedent for Congress mandating a different style of election. Imagine, if you will, the following hypothetical: in the next decennial census, Texas gains another two seats in the House of Representatives. But, whether because of laxity or political disagreement, by the time the next federal election rolls around, Texas has still not adopted a redistricting plan. What then happens with respect to the two new Representatives?
The answer can be found in 2 U.S.C. §2a(c) – an existing, little-remarked-upon, provision of law. The statute provides that if no redistricting law has been passed, then “if there is an increase in the number of Representatives, such additional Representative or Representatives shall be elected from the State at large.”
In other words, Congress has the authority, exercised once already, to impose on the States the general format by which the States may elect Representatives. It may, as it has, require single-member district elections. But it may (as it also has) change that paradigm and require elections to be held at large. And if it has that power, then it likewise has the power to mandate that statewide at-large elections distribute seats on a proportional basis.
There is much to recommend this idea. For one thing, bereft of the security of gerrymandered districts, candidates would need to run more centrist campaigns that appealed to a broader electorate. Breaking the distorted district deadlock would incentivize more moderate positions and break the extremist wing's stranglehold.
For another, at-large proportionate districting would give value to every vote. As it stands today, millions of voters have their votes rendered meaningless by our first-past-the-post system. To cite a trivial example, the 6 million Trump voters in California were more than in any other state in the Union, save Texas and Florida, yet their votes were meaningless. This restructuring would give their votes meaning.
Would it have an immediate impact? Likely. The total vote in 2024 in the House of Representatives was roughly 74 million Republicans to 70 million Democrats. So the number of seats each party held would likely be the same. But imagine the change in the character of Representatives. One has to believe (or vainly hope) that a party candidate list headed by an extremist like Marjorie Taylor Greene would be less appealing to a broader statewide electorate than to those in her narrow purpose-built district.
Are there risks? Likewise, yes – if Congress can mandate proportional results, it can also mandate bullet voting and give all congressional seats to the state party with the most votes. And the political science literature is rife with essays on the dangers of proportional representation – a danger we see clearly around the globe.
But the current system of designing districts is badly broken, creating a deeply polarized legislature. Perhaps nothing can solve the problem, but it might be worth a try.
Why have single-district representation in the first place? Without a districting requirement, we would not have congressional districts carved up into cartoon-like configurations.
When adopted by the British Parliament, geographic districting was thought to allow localities with distinct economic, social, and cultural interests to have direct representation. It was also, before the advent of the gerrymander, administratively convenient, linking counties and towns with clear boundaries into easily mapped venues.
Neither of those reasons applies to the modern gerrymander, whose very purpose is to disaggregate communities with distinctive social interests to diminish their power through the creation of bizarrely drawn districts. Which leads one to ask – are congressional districts mandatory? Do we have to live with a system where State legislatures rig the vote?
The surprising answer is that we don’t. Congress can, if it chooses, do away with congressional districts entirely and have Members of the House of Representatives elected on a statewide proportional basis.
The rule requiring single-member districts is a creature not of Constitutional mandate but of federal statute. Current law requires that individual representatives represent distinct districts. As 2. U.S.C. §2c provides: “In each State … there shall be established by law a number of districts . . . and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established . . . .”
But that is not inevitable. Indeed, there is existing precedent for Congress mandating a different style of election. Imagine, if you will, the following hypothetical: in the next decennial census, Texas gains another two seats in the House of Representatives. But, whether because of laxity or political disagreement, by the time the next federal election rolls around, Texas has still not adopted a redistricting plan. What then happens with respect to the two new Representatives?
The answer can be found in 2 U.S.C. §2a(c) – an existing, little-remarked-upon, provision of law. The statute provides that if no redistricting law has been passed, then “if there is an increase in the number of Representatives, such additional Representative or Representatives shall be elected from the State at large.”
In other words, Congress has the authority, exercised once already, to impose on the States the general format by which the States may elect Representatives. It may, as it has, require single-member district elections. But it may (as it also has) change that paradigm and require elections to be held at large. And if it has that power, then it likewise has the power to mandate that statewide at-large elections distribute seats on a proportional basis.
There is much to recommend this idea. For one thing, bereft of the security of gerrymandered districts, candidates would need to run more centrist campaigns that appealed to a broader electorate. Breaking the distorted district deadlock would incentivize more moderate positions and break the extremist wing's stranglehold.
For another, at-large proportionate districting would give value to every vote. As it stands today, millions of voters have their votes rendered meaningless by our first-past-the-post system. To cite a trivial example, the 6 million Trump voters in California were more than in any other state in the Union, save Texas and Florida, yet their votes were meaningless. This restructuring would give their votes meaning.
Would it have an immediate impact? Likely. The total vote in 2024 in the House of Representatives was roughly 74 million Republicans to 70 million Democrats. So the number of seats each party held would likely be the same. But imagine the change in the character of Representatives. One has to believe (or vainly hope) that a party candidate list headed by an extremist like Marjorie Taylor Greene would be less appealing to a broader statewide electorate than to those in her narrow purpose-built district.
Are there risks? Likewise, yes – if Congress can mandate proportional results, it can also mandate bullet voting and give all congressional seats to the state party with the most votes. And the political science literature is rife with essays on the dangers of proportional representation – a danger we see clearly around the globe.
But the current system of designing districts is badly broken, creating a deeply polarized legislature. Perhaps nothing can solve the problem, but it might be worth a try.
Why have single-district representation in the first place? Without a districting requirement, we would not have congressional districts carved up into cartoon-like configurations.
When adopted by the British Parliament, geographic districting was thought to allow localities with distinct economic, social, and cultural interests to have direct representation. It was also, before the advent of the gerrymander, administratively convenient, linking counties and towns with clear boundaries into easily mapped venues.
Neither of those reasons applies to the modern gerrymander, whose very purpose is to disaggregate communities with distinctive social interests to diminish their power through the creation of bizarrely drawn districts. Which leads one to ask – are congressional districts mandatory? Do we have to live with a system where State legislatures rig the vote?
The surprising answer is that we don’t. Congress can, if it chooses, do away with congressional districts entirely and have Members of the House of Representatives elected on a statewide proportional basis.
The rule requiring single-member districts is a creature not of Constitutional mandate but of federal statute. Current law requires that individual representatives represent distinct districts. As 2. U.S.C. §2c provides: “In each State … there shall be established by law a number of districts . . . and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established . . . .”
But that is not inevitable. Indeed, there is existing precedent for Congress mandating a different style of election. Imagine, if you will, the following hypothetical: in the next decennial census, Texas gains another two seats in the House of Representatives. But, whether because of laxity or political disagreement, by the time the next federal election rolls around, Texas has still not adopted a redistricting plan. What then happens with respect to the two new Representatives?
The answer can be found in 2 U.S.C. §2a(c) – an existing, little-remarked-upon, provision of law. The statute provides that if no redistricting law has been passed, then “if there is an increase in the number of Representatives, such additional Representative or Representatives shall be elected from the State at large.”
In other words, Congress has the authority, exercised once already, to impose on the States the general format by which the States may elect Representatives. It may, as it has, require single-member district elections. But it may (as it also has) change that paradigm and require elections to be held at large. And if it has that power, then it likewise has the power to mandate that statewide at-large elections distribute seats on a proportional basis.
There is much to recommend this idea. For one thing, bereft of the security of gerrymandered districts, candidates would need to run more centrist campaigns that appealed to a broader electorate. Breaking the distorted district deadlock would incentivize more moderate positions and break the extremist wing's stranglehold.
For another, at-large proportionate districting would give value to every vote. As it stands today, millions of voters have their votes rendered meaningless by our first-past-the-post system. To cite a trivial example, the 6 million Trump voters in California were more than in any other state in the Union, save Texas and Florida, yet their votes were meaningless. This restructuring would give their votes meaning.
Would it have an immediate impact? Likely. The total vote in 2024 in the House of Representatives was roughly 74 million Republicans to 70 million Democrats. So the number of seats each party held would likely be the same. But imagine the change in the character of Representatives. One has to believe (or vainly hope) that a party candidate list headed by an extremist like Marjorie Taylor Greene would be less appealing to a broader statewide electorate than to those in her narrow purpose-built district.
Are there risks? Likewise, yes – if Congress can mandate proportional results, it can also mandate bullet voting and give all congressional seats to the state party with the most votes. And the political science literature is rife with essays on the dangers of proportional representation – a danger we see clearly around the globe.
But the current system of designing districts is badly broken, creating a deeply polarized legislature. Perhaps nothing can solve the problem, but it might be worth a try.
About the Author
Paul Rosenzweig
Paul Rosenzweig is the founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company. He formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security. Rosenzweig is a Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University, an advisor to and former member of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security, and a Contributing Editor of the Lawfare blog.
About the Author
Paul Rosenzweig
Paul Rosenzweig is the founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company. He formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security. Rosenzweig is a Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University, an advisor to and former member of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security, and a Contributing Editor of the Lawfare blog.
About the Author
Paul Rosenzweig
Paul Rosenzweig is the founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company. He formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security. Rosenzweig is a Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University, an advisor to and former member of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security, and a Contributing Editor of the Lawfare blog.
About the Author
Paul Rosenzweig
Paul Rosenzweig is the founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company. He formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security. Rosenzweig is a Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University, an advisor to and former member of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security, and a Contributing Editor of the Lawfare blog.
About the Author
Paul Rosenzweig
Paul Rosenzweig is the founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company. He formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security. Rosenzweig is a Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University, an advisor to and former member of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security, and a Contributing Editor of the Lawfare blog.
About the Author
Paul Rosenzweig
Paul Rosenzweig is the founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company. He formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security. Rosenzweig is a Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University, an advisor to and former member of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security, and a Contributing Editor of the Lawfare blog.
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