Nov 5, 2025
The Rise of Populism, Right to Left
Seth Masket
Nov 5, 2025
The Rise of Populism, Right to Left
Seth Masket
Nov 5, 2025
The Rise of Populism, Right to Left
Seth Masket
Nov 5, 2025
The Rise of Populism, Right to Left
Seth Masket
Nov 5, 2025
The Rise of Populism, Right to Left
Seth Masket
Nov 5, 2025
The Rise of Populism, Right to Left
Seth Masket
The rise of populism has been a noted phenomenon in many democracies around the world in recent decades. But its development in the United States has not been even across party lines, with populism substantially transforming the modern Republican Party but only making a dent on the Democratic side. Yet this imbalance may be changing.
Populism is a term that gets thrown around quite a bit in the political media, so it’s important to be clear about a definition. Generally, it describes a set of beliefs and rhetoric depicting politics as a struggle by “regular people” against some entrenched and shadowy set of “elites” that does not have their interests at heart and is even anti-American. Populism is generally seen as a “thin” ideology, describing only a narrow portion of the world, that attaches itself to a larger existing ideology like liberalism or conservatism. Populists tend to see their worldview as the only legitimate one, and have no interest in more pluralist visions of democratic debate.
For left-populists or progressives, the “elites” are concentrated wealth — billionaires, large corporations, etc., that exert disproportionate and secretive influence over the government. For conservative populists, the “elites” are usually cultural figures: the entertainment industry, the mainstream media, unelected bureaucrats, and, yes, professors and administrators at top universities.
It took an extensive series of events for a populist worldview to take over the Republican Party, and much of that happened before Donald Trump came to power, starting in the early 1990s. Among these events were:
The rise of conservative talk radio hosts (especially Rush Limbaugh) and television news personalities (notably on Fox News), who developed a massive and loyal audience to whom Republican officeholders had to cater.
Pat Buchanan’s challenge to the Republican establishment in the 1992 and 1996 presidential primaries.
Newt Gingrich’s speakership – in which he demonstrated that a bombastic and combative style was not only not electoral poison, but could help – and his recruitment of House candidates in his image.
A vehement and racially-coded reaction to Barack Obama’s presidency.
Perhaps one of the most important changes was a rejection by rank-and-file party members of Republican leadership. The prolonged Iraq War, once a unifying event for Republicans, became a divisive one, with many populist Republicans coming to view their party leaders as having made a catastrophic mistake. What’s more, many more conservative Republican voters were uncomfortable with the presidential candidacies of John McCain and Mitt Romney in 2008 and 2012, respectively, but were told by their party leaders that those were the only candidates who could keep Obama out of the White House. After those two losses, the rank and file had lost any interest in listening to their party’s leaders. Thus, when many party elites urged primary voters to reject Donald Trump in 2016, they were promptly ignored.
Do we see anything like this on the left? One could see the beginnings of this in Sen. Bernie Sanders’ (I-VT) 2016 run for the Democratic presidential nomination, as well as during the 2018 midterm elections, in which several progressive Democratic House challengers – with the backing of Sanders, Justice Democrats, and other related groups – threatened the party’s leadership. Yet, other than Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (NY) and a few others, populist challenges largely failed on the Democratic side that year.
Yet, we could be seeing a stronger push within the Democratic Party heading into the 2026 midterms. Just as Republican elites had lost favor among their rank-and-file in 2016, so Democratic elites have lost favor among their rank-and-file in 2025. Democratic Party favorability among Democrats has been dropping steadily in 2025, while Republican Party approval among Republicans is rising. It’s only one election in one city, but Zohran Mamdani’s victory in New York City’s Democratic mayoral primary suggests a party ripe for a populist moment, with elites uncomfortable with his stances not only unable to prevent his nomination but ultimately closing ranks behind him as the nominee.
What would a left-populist takeover of the Democratic Party look like? It would have notable differences from the MAGA movement. It would be far more eager to push for stronger economic regulations, far less interested in courting the favor of wealthy leaders in Silicon Valley and Wall Street, and more supportive of a wealth tax and expanded federal health coverage. But the existence of two major populist parties, each of whom rejects the legitimacy of the other, vying for control of the federal government portends even greater divisiveness and dysfunctionality than we’ve seen so far.
The rise of populism has been a noted phenomenon in many democracies around the world in recent decades. But its development in the United States has not been even across party lines, with populism substantially transforming the modern Republican Party but only making a dent on the Democratic side. Yet this imbalance may be changing.
Populism is a term that gets thrown around quite a bit in the political media, so it’s important to be clear about a definition. Generally, it describes a set of beliefs and rhetoric depicting politics as a struggle by “regular people” against some entrenched and shadowy set of “elites” that does not have their interests at heart and is even anti-American. Populism is generally seen as a “thin” ideology, describing only a narrow portion of the world, that attaches itself to a larger existing ideology like liberalism or conservatism. Populists tend to see their worldview as the only legitimate one, and have no interest in more pluralist visions of democratic debate.
For left-populists or progressives, the “elites” are concentrated wealth — billionaires, large corporations, etc., that exert disproportionate and secretive influence over the government. For conservative populists, the “elites” are usually cultural figures: the entertainment industry, the mainstream media, unelected bureaucrats, and, yes, professors and administrators at top universities.
It took an extensive series of events for a populist worldview to take over the Republican Party, and much of that happened before Donald Trump came to power, starting in the early 1990s. Among these events were:
The rise of conservative talk radio hosts (especially Rush Limbaugh) and television news personalities (notably on Fox News), who developed a massive and loyal audience to whom Republican officeholders had to cater.
Pat Buchanan’s challenge to the Republican establishment in the 1992 and 1996 presidential primaries.
Newt Gingrich’s speakership – in which he demonstrated that a bombastic and combative style was not only not electoral poison, but could help – and his recruitment of House candidates in his image.
A vehement and racially-coded reaction to Barack Obama’s presidency.
Perhaps one of the most important changes was a rejection by rank-and-file party members of Republican leadership. The prolonged Iraq War, once a unifying event for Republicans, became a divisive one, with many populist Republicans coming to view their party leaders as having made a catastrophic mistake. What’s more, many more conservative Republican voters were uncomfortable with the presidential candidacies of John McCain and Mitt Romney in 2008 and 2012, respectively, but were told by their party leaders that those were the only candidates who could keep Obama out of the White House. After those two losses, the rank and file had lost any interest in listening to their party’s leaders. Thus, when many party elites urged primary voters to reject Donald Trump in 2016, they were promptly ignored.
Do we see anything like this on the left? One could see the beginnings of this in Sen. Bernie Sanders’ (I-VT) 2016 run for the Democratic presidential nomination, as well as during the 2018 midterm elections, in which several progressive Democratic House challengers – with the backing of Sanders, Justice Democrats, and other related groups – threatened the party’s leadership. Yet, other than Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (NY) and a few others, populist challenges largely failed on the Democratic side that year.
Yet, we could be seeing a stronger push within the Democratic Party heading into the 2026 midterms. Just as Republican elites had lost favor among their rank-and-file in 2016, so Democratic elites have lost favor among their rank-and-file in 2025. Democratic Party favorability among Democrats has been dropping steadily in 2025, while Republican Party approval among Republicans is rising. It’s only one election in one city, but Zohran Mamdani’s victory in New York City’s Democratic mayoral primary suggests a party ripe for a populist moment, with elites uncomfortable with his stances not only unable to prevent his nomination but ultimately closing ranks behind him as the nominee.
What would a left-populist takeover of the Democratic Party look like? It would have notable differences from the MAGA movement. It would be far more eager to push for stronger economic regulations, far less interested in courting the favor of wealthy leaders in Silicon Valley and Wall Street, and more supportive of a wealth tax and expanded federal health coverage. But the existence of two major populist parties, each of whom rejects the legitimacy of the other, vying for control of the federal government portends even greater divisiveness and dysfunctionality than we’ve seen so far.
The rise of populism has been a noted phenomenon in many democracies around the world in recent decades. But its development in the United States has not been even across party lines, with populism substantially transforming the modern Republican Party but only making a dent on the Democratic side. Yet this imbalance may be changing.
Populism is a term that gets thrown around quite a bit in the political media, so it’s important to be clear about a definition. Generally, it describes a set of beliefs and rhetoric depicting politics as a struggle by “regular people” against some entrenched and shadowy set of “elites” that does not have their interests at heart and is even anti-American. Populism is generally seen as a “thin” ideology, describing only a narrow portion of the world, that attaches itself to a larger existing ideology like liberalism or conservatism. Populists tend to see their worldview as the only legitimate one, and have no interest in more pluralist visions of democratic debate.
For left-populists or progressives, the “elites” are concentrated wealth — billionaires, large corporations, etc., that exert disproportionate and secretive influence over the government. For conservative populists, the “elites” are usually cultural figures: the entertainment industry, the mainstream media, unelected bureaucrats, and, yes, professors and administrators at top universities.
It took an extensive series of events for a populist worldview to take over the Republican Party, and much of that happened before Donald Trump came to power, starting in the early 1990s. Among these events were:
The rise of conservative talk radio hosts (especially Rush Limbaugh) and television news personalities (notably on Fox News), who developed a massive and loyal audience to whom Republican officeholders had to cater.
Pat Buchanan’s challenge to the Republican establishment in the 1992 and 1996 presidential primaries.
Newt Gingrich’s speakership – in which he demonstrated that a bombastic and combative style was not only not electoral poison, but could help – and his recruitment of House candidates in his image.
A vehement and racially-coded reaction to Barack Obama’s presidency.
Perhaps one of the most important changes was a rejection by rank-and-file party members of Republican leadership. The prolonged Iraq War, once a unifying event for Republicans, became a divisive one, with many populist Republicans coming to view their party leaders as having made a catastrophic mistake. What’s more, many more conservative Republican voters were uncomfortable with the presidential candidacies of John McCain and Mitt Romney in 2008 and 2012, respectively, but were told by their party leaders that those were the only candidates who could keep Obama out of the White House. After those two losses, the rank and file had lost any interest in listening to their party’s leaders. Thus, when many party elites urged primary voters to reject Donald Trump in 2016, they were promptly ignored.
Do we see anything like this on the left? One could see the beginnings of this in Sen. Bernie Sanders’ (I-VT) 2016 run for the Democratic presidential nomination, as well as during the 2018 midterm elections, in which several progressive Democratic House challengers – with the backing of Sanders, Justice Democrats, and other related groups – threatened the party’s leadership. Yet, other than Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (NY) and a few others, populist challenges largely failed on the Democratic side that year.
Yet, we could be seeing a stronger push within the Democratic Party heading into the 2026 midterms. Just as Republican elites had lost favor among their rank-and-file in 2016, so Democratic elites have lost favor among their rank-and-file in 2025. Democratic Party favorability among Democrats has been dropping steadily in 2025, while Republican Party approval among Republicans is rising. It’s only one election in one city, but Zohran Mamdani’s victory in New York City’s Democratic mayoral primary suggests a party ripe for a populist moment, with elites uncomfortable with his stances not only unable to prevent his nomination but ultimately closing ranks behind him as the nominee.
What would a left-populist takeover of the Democratic Party look like? It would have notable differences from the MAGA movement. It would be far more eager to push for stronger economic regulations, far less interested in courting the favor of wealthy leaders in Silicon Valley and Wall Street, and more supportive of a wealth tax and expanded federal health coverage. But the existence of two major populist parties, each of whom rejects the legitimacy of the other, vying for control of the federal government portends even greater divisiveness and dysfunctionality than we’ve seen so far.
The rise of populism has been a noted phenomenon in many democracies around the world in recent decades. But its development in the United States has not been even across party lines, with populism substantially transforming the modern Republican Party but only making a dent on the Democratic side. Yet this imbalance may be changing.
Populism is a term that gets thrown around quite a bit in the political media, so it’s important to be clear about a definition. Generally, it describes a set of beliefs and rhetoric depicting politics as a struggle by “regular people” against some entrenched and shadowy set of “elites” that does not have their interests at heart and is even anti-American. Populism is generally seen as a “thin” ideology, describing only a narrow portion of the world, that attaches itself to a larger existing ideology like liberalism or conservatism. Populists tend to see their worldview as the only legitimate one, and have no interest in more pluralist visions of democratic debate.
For left-populists or progressives, the “elites” are concentrated wealth — billionaires, large corporations, etc., that exert disproportionate and secretive influence over the government. For conservative populists, the “elites” are usually cultural figures: the entertainment industry, the mainstream media, unelected bureaucrats, and, yes, professors and administrators at top universities.
It took an extensive series of events for a populist worldview to take over the Republican Party, and much of that happened before Donald Trump came to power, starting in the early 1990s. Among these events were:
The rise of conservative talk radio hosts (especially Rush Limbaugh) and television news personalities (notably on Fox News), who developed a massive and loyal audience to whom Republican officeholders had to cater.
Pat Buchanan’s challenge to the Republican establishment in the 1992 and 1996 presidential primaries.
Newt Gingrich’s speakership – in which he demonstrated that a bombastic and combative style was not only not electoral poison, but could help – and his recruitment of House candidates in his image.
A vehement and racially-coded reaction to Barack Obama’s presidency.
Perhaps one of the most important changes was a rejection by rank-and-file party members of Republican leadership. The prolonged Iraq War, once a unifying event for Republicans, became a divisive one, with many populist Republicans coming to view their party leaders as having made a catastrophic mistake. What’s more, many more conservative Republican voters were uncomfortable with the presidential candidacies of John McCain and Mitt Romney in 2008 and 2012, respectively, but were told by their party leaders that those were the only candidates who could keep Obama out of the White House. After those two losses, the rank and file had lost any interest in listening to their party’s leaders. Thus, when many party elites urged primary voters to reject Donald Trump in 2016, they were promptly ignored.
Do we see anything like this on the left? One could see the beginnings of this in Sen. Bernie Sanders’ (I-VT) 2016 run for the Democratic presidential nomination, as well as during the 2018 midterm elections, in which several progressive Democratic House challengers – with the backing of Sanders, Justice Democrats, and other related groups – threatened the party’s leadership. Yet, other than Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (NY) and a few others, populist challenges largely failed on the Democratic side that year.
Yet, we could be seeing a stronger push within the Democratic Party heading into the 2026 midterms. Just as Republican elites had lost favor among their rank-and-file in 2016, so Democratic elites have lost favor among their rank-and-file in 2025. Democratic Party favorability among Democrats has been dropping steadily in 2025, while Republican Party approval among Republicans is rising. It’s only one election in one city, but Zohran Mamdani’s victory in New York City’s Democratic mayoral primary suggests a party ripe for a populist moment, with elites uncomfortable with his stances not only unable to prevent his nomination but ultimately closing ranks behind him as the nominee.
What would a left-populist takeover of the Democratic Party look like? It would have notable differences from the MAGA movement. It would be far more eager to push for stronger economic regulations, far less interested in courting the favor of wealthy leaders in Silicon Valley and Wall Street, and more supportive of a wealth tax and expanded federal health coverage. But the existence of two major populist parties, each of whom rejects the legitimacy of the other, vying for control of the federal government portends even greater divisiveness and dysfunctionality than we’ve seen so far.
The rise of populism has been a noted phenomenon in many democracies around the world in recent decades. But its development in the United States has not been even across party lines, with populism substantially transforming the modern Republican Party but only making a dent on the Democratic side. Yet this imbalance may be changing.
Populism is a term that gets thrown around quite a bit in the political media, so it’s important to be clear about a definition. Generally, it describes a set of beliefs and rhetoric depicting politics as a struggle by “regular people” against some entrenched and shadowy set of “elites” that does not have their interests at heart and is even anti-American. Populism is generally seen as a “thin” ideology, describing only a narrow portion of the world, that attaches itself to a larger existing ideology like liberalism or conservatism. Populists tend to see their worldview as the only legitimate one, and have no interest in more pluralist visions of democratic debate.
For left-populists or progressives, the “elites” are concentrated wealth — billionaires, large corporations, etc., that exert disproportionate and secretive influence over the government. For conservative populists, the “elites” are usually cultural figures: the entertainment industry, the mainstream media, unelected bureaucrats, and, yes, professors and administrators at top universities.
It took an extensive series of events for a populist worldview to take over the Republican Party, and much of that happened before Donald Trump came to power, starting in the early 1990s. Among these events were:
The rise of conservative talk radio hosts (especially Rush Limbaugh) and television news personalities (notably on Fox News), who developed a massive and loyal audience to whom Republican officeholders had to cater.
Pat Buchanan’s challenge to the Republican establishment in the 1992 and 1996 presidential primaries.
Newt Gingrich’s speakership – in which he demonstrated that a bombastic and combative style was not only not electoral poison, but could help – and his recruitment of House candidates in his image.
A vehement and racially-coded reaction to Barack Obama’s presidency.
Perhaps one of the most important changes was a rejection by rank-and-file party members of Republican leadership. The prolonged Iraq War, once a unifying event for Republicans, became a divisive one, with many populist Republicans coming to view their party leaders as having made a catastrophic mistake. What’s more, many more conservative Republican voters were uncomfortable with the presidential candidacies of John McCain and Mitt Romney in 2008 and 2012, respectively, but were told by their party leaders that those were the only candidates who could keep Obama out of the White House. After those two losses, the rank and file had lost any interest in listening to their party’s leaders. Thus, when many party elites urged primary voters to reject Donald Trump in 2016, they were promptly ignored.
Do we see anything like this on the left? One could see the beginnings of this in Sen. Bernie Sanders’ (I-VT) 2016 run for the Democratic presidential nomination, as well as during the 2018 midterm elections, in which several progressive Democratic House challengers – with the backing of Sanders, Justice Democrats, and other related groups – threatened the party’s leadership. Yet, other than Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (NY) and a few others, populist challenges largely failed on the Democratic side that year.
Yet, we could be seeing a stronger push within the Democratic Party heading into the 2026 midterms. Just as Republican elites had lost favor among their rank-and-file in 2016, so Democratic elites have lost favor among their rank-and-file in 2025. Democratic Party favorability among Democrats has been dropping steadily in 2025, while Republican Party approval among Republicans is rising. It’s only one election in one city, but Zohran Mamdani’s victory in New York City’s Democratic mayoral primary suggests a party ripe for a populist moment, with elites uncomfortable with his stances not only unable to prevent his nomination but ultimately closing ranks behind him as the nominee.
What would a left-populist takeover of the Democratic Party look like? It would have notable differences from the MAGA movement. It would be far more eager to push for stronger economic regulations, far less interested in courting the favor of wealthy leaders in Silicon Valley and Wall Street, and more supportive of a wealth tax and expanded federal health coverage. But the existence of two major populist parties, each of whom rejects the legitimacy of the other, vying for control of the federal government portends even greater divisiveness and dysfunctionality than we’ve seen so far.
The rise of populism has been a noted phenomenon in many democracies around the world in recent decades. But its development in the United States has not been even across party lines, with populism substantially transforming the modern Republican Party but only making a dent on the Democratic side. Yet this imbalance may be changing.
Populism is a term that gets thrown around quite a bit in the political media, so it’s important to be clear about a definition. Generally, it describes a set of beliefs and rhetoric depicting politics as a struggle by “regular people” against some entrenched and shadowy set of “elites” that does not have their interests at heart and is even anti-American. Populism is generally seen as a “thin” ideology, describing only a narrow portion of the world, that attaches itself to a larger existing ideology like liberalism or conservatism. Populists tend to see their worldview as the only legitimate one, and have no interest in more pluralist visions of democratic debate.
For left-populists or progressives, the “elites” are concentrated wealth — billionaires, large corporations, etc., that exert disproportionate and secretive influence over the government. For conservative populists, the “elites” are usually cultural figures: the entertainment industry, the mainstream media, unelected bureaucrats, and, yes, professors and administrators at top universities.
It took an extensive series of events for a populist worldview to take over the Republican Party, and much of that happened before Donald Trump came to power, starting in the early 1990s. Among these events were:
The rise of conservative talk radio hosts (especially Rush Limbaugh) and television news personalities (notably on Fox News), who developed a massive and loyal audience to whom Republican officeholders had to cater.
Pat Buchanan’s challenge to the Republican establishment in the 1992 and 1996 presidential primaries.
Newt Gingrich’s speakership – in which he demonstrated that a bombastic and combative style was not only not electoral poison, but could help – and his recruitment of House candidates in his image.
A vehement and racially-coded reaction to Barack Obama’s presidency.
Perhaps one of the most important changes was a rejection by rank-and-file party members of Republican leadership. The prolonged Iraq War, once a unifying event for Republicans, became a divisive one, with many populist Republicans coming to view their party leaders as having made a catastrophic mistake. What’s more, many more conservative Republican voters were uncomfortable with the presidential candidacies of John McCain and Mitt Romney in 2008 and 2012, respectively, but were told by their party leaders that those were the only candidates who could keep Obama out of the White House. After those two losses, the rank and file had lost any interest in listening to their party’s leaders. Thus, when many party elites urged primary voters to reject Donald Trump in 2016, they were promptly ignored.
Do we see anything like this on the left? One could see the beginnings of this in Sen. Bernie Sanders’ (I-VT) 2016 run for the Democratic presidential nomination, as well as during the 2018 midterm elections, in which several progressive Democratic House challengers – with the backing of Sanders, Justice Democrats, and other related groups – threatened the party’s leadership. Yet, other than Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (NY) and a few others, populist challenges largely failed on the Democratic side that year.
Yet, we could be seeing a stronger push within the Democratic Party heading into the 2026 midterms. Just as Republican elites had lost favor among their rank-and-file in 2016, so Democratic elites have lost favor among their rank-and-file in 2025. Democratic Party favorability among Democrats has been dropping steadily in 2025, while Republican Party approval among Republicans is rising. It’s only one election in one city, but Zohran Mamdani’s victory in New York City’s Democratic mayoral primary suggests a party ripe for a populist moment, with elites uncomfortable with his stances not only unable to prevent his nomination but ultimately closing ranks behind him as the nominee.
What would a left-populist takeover of the Democratic Party look like? It would have notable differences from the MAGA movement. It would be far more eager to push for stronger economic regulations, far less interested in courting the favor of wealthy leaders in Silicon Valley and Wall Street, and more supportive of a wealth tax and expanded federal health coverage. But the existence of two major populist parties, each of whom rejects the legitimacy of the other, vying for control of the federal government portends even greater divisiveness and dysfunctionality than we’ve seen so far.
About the Author
Seth Masket
Seth Masket is a professor of political science at the University of Denver as well as the author of the forthcoming book "The Elephants in the Room: How Trump Voters Seized the Party from Republican Leaders," as well as his Substack newsletter “Tusk.”
About the Author
Seth Masket
Seth Masket is a professor of political science at the University of Denver as well as the author of the forthcoming book "The Elephants in the Room: How Trump Voters Seized the Party from Republican Leaders," as well as his Substack newsletter “Tusk.”
About the Author
Seth Masket
Seth Masket is a professor of political science at the University of Denver as well as the author of the forthcoming book "The Elephants in the Room: How Trump Voters Seized the Party from Republican Leaders," as well as his Substack newsletter “Tusk.”
About the Author
Seth Masket
Seth Masket is a professor of political science at the University of Denver as well as the author of the forthcoming book "The Elephants in the Room: How Trump Voters Seized the Party from Republican Leaders," as well as his Substack newsletter “Tusk.”
About the Author
Seth Masket
Seth Masket is a professor of political science at the University of Denver as well as the author of the forthcoming book "The Elephants in the Room: How Trump Voters Seized the Party from Republican Leaders," as well as his Substack newsletter “Tusk.”
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