What happens when authoritarian populists lose to their democratic opponents in democratic elections? A process of restoration of democracy and the rule of law, following the best international practices, will take place, you might say.

Much easier said than done. Especially when the populists have deeply undermined the fundamental institutions of democracy, such as legislative processes, the separation of powers, the system of justice, and public prosecution. The process of reform is arduous and lengthy; rather than a broad highway with clear signposts, it is a narrow, bumpy country road, with no signs indicating the destination, and plenty of potholes along the way. Or to change the metaphor, a minefield left by the former incumbents to their democratic successors. Or, to change the metaphor once again, a Sisyphean democracy.

This is how I describe the post-2023 politics in Poland – for Poland is my case study of “Sisyphean democracy.” After victory in the October 2023 elections, the democratic opposition headed by Donald Tusk took power in mid-December that year, and set about a program of democratic reforms, codified in an “Action Plan” submitted to the EU. But not everything worked according to plan. There are clear lessons in this story for future post-populist transitions, such as those in Hungary, Turkey or India, among others.

Legal landmines, “traps,” or “ambushes” are the various entrenchments of remnants of the authoritarian period: remnants that prevent the new government from achieving effective reforms within the existing constitutional framework. In Poland those entrenchments had been established by statutes, and with the Law and Justice Party (PiS) aligned President having the power to veto statutes, those statutory “traps” are de facto entrenched with near-constitutional force. The President and PiS parliamentarians can also still use the façade “Constitutional Tribunal” which, staffed entirely with PiS nominees, invalidates any statute the PiS parliamentary minority does not like. In addition, the top judicial appointment body (the National Council of the Judiciary) is composed predominantly of nominees of PiS; the Supreme Court: ditto, and top public prosecutors appointed by PiS have their terms of office set in stone, going well into the future.

What should, and what can be done in such a situation? How can democracy and an independent system of justice be restored, despite all the landmines and officials inherited from and loyal to the ancien régime, and protected in their positions by statutory means of their own making, often in anticipation of the possibility of electoral defeat? This seems squarely to raise the old rhetorical question: Can you restore the rule of law while breaching the rule of law?

The answer seems to be obvious – however, it is anything but. If the rule of law is understood as faithful, strict compliance by the authorities with the language of all the statutes in force, then the call for compliance with the rule of law equals a recipe for paralysis. It is how a Sisyphean democracy was supposed to work, as envisioned by the populist predecessors. On the other hand, disregarding the legal provisions in force subjects the democratic government to the predictable accusation, both by local rule-of-law NGOs and the international community (in Europe, the Venice Commission in particular), that their successors are simply replicating the infamous practices of the populists, except this time against them.

There is no easy solution to this conundrum. Still, the very realization of what is at stake is a step towards a solution and to overcoming  the predicament of Sisyphean democracy. The next step is to rethink the meaning of the rule of law and acknowledge openly that, under such circumstances, only a direct appeal, by public authorities, to a “higher,” supra-statutory law (the Constitution, depending on its substance; European law; international legal standards), while disregarding some statutory provisions (and institutions rendered unconstitutional by populist predecessors) can offer a way out of the dilemma.

In this case study, in Poland the restoration of democracy has been recently made even more difficult by the election of President Karol Nawrocki, the PiS-supported candidate and a zealous populist, in June 2025, for the next five years. This will mark a dramatic cohabitation. How Polish democrats will handle the dilemma just outlined, against all odds, is likely to carry important lessons for democratic forces engaged (today and in the future) in post-populist transitions elsewhere in the world.