Editor’s Note: This is the second essay in the Democracy Project’s new series on Congress.

A defining attribute of our democracy is the balance of power across three branches of government. Policymaking, representation, and enforcement are more stable when responsibilities are distributed and power is equally apportioned. In order for this great experiment to function properly, all three branches need to have the strength required to perform and hold their counterparts accountable.

But as the federal government has expanded in size over the past century, most of its growth has been housed in the executive branch. Today, the president and the bureaucracy control a vast jurisdiction of regulatory powers that often circumvent the essential function of Congress: lawmaking. And as the Supreme Court becomes more proactive in advancing its own political preferences, Congress’s representative authority again falls to the wayside.

Many attribute Congress’s relative weakness to biased leaders, partisan division, and members more focused on making statements than policies. But beneath the surface of these big-picture problems is something more basic than partisan polarization and attention-seeking on social media: a lack of congressional capacity and a disparity of resources granted to party leaders.

Today, Congress faces more policy problems and a larger and more diverse constituency than at any point in American history. Our legislature is also tasked with controlling an unwieldy bureaucracy and an increasingly forceful executive, all while being prodded by a tactical court system. But compared to the executive branch, Congress is vastly understaffed and under-resourced. Turnover is pervasive; the average staffer stays less than two years in a congressional office, and Congress hasn’t had a meaningful pay raise in almost 20 years (and when accounting for inflation, pay has significantly decreased). Although the U.S. population has become larger and more diverse, staff sizes and budgets have stayed the same; in the House, rank-and-file offices have been capped at 18 full-time staff since 1975, despite representing districts now close to 800,000 people.

This lack of experienced, well-paid staff generates a loss of institutional knowledge that seeps into not only policymaking, but also investigatory work, procedural knowledge, and constituent relations. Legislating is less responsive and less representative, as staffers don’t have the time, resources, or, in many cases, the experience to meet the moment.

Yet as congressional offices have become weaker, party leaders have gotten stronger. This is by design: Upon taking the gavel as Speaker of the House in 1995, Newt Gingrich (R-GA) defunded or eliminated key alternative sources of power, including committee staff, congressional caucus staff, and support agencies such as the Congressional Research Service. By removing these resources, Gingrich centralized information and power in the hands of party leaders. This power has become entrenched over time, with higher staff capacities for leadership offices, additional budgets for party-led activities, and new leadership offices to expand the scope of party responsibility.

The legislation that Congress does produce reflects this dynamic: large, omnibus bills managed by party leaders to encourage bipartisan coalitions across committees, but immensely complex and often devoid of rank-and-file input. While this outcome is better than total gridlock, the imbalance of power within the chamber has severed the relationship between the constituent and their member, making it difficult for lawmakers to meaningfully engage in policymaking. Over time, this reliance on party leaders has expanded beyond bill development and procedure, even dictating things like constituent communication.

While this leader-led approach to lawmaking and representation has allowed Congress to hobble together solutions that cross jurisdictions and entrenched partisanship, the declining capacity of rank-and-file members and the centralization of resources in party leader offices has weakened Congress as a whole. The modern Congress has become centered around party goals, leaving even the most qualified and ambitious rank-and-file members reliant on party leaders and complicit in increasing partisanship. As a result, the institution is often on the defensive—performing some checks by stalling executive nominations and maintaining authority via funding the government, but often failing to balance the federal government with proactive policy solutions.

In order for Congress to tackle polarization, gridlock, and an aggressive executive branch, it must first repair its infrastructure. Committee work and congressional investigations need manpower, with resources and retention to address big problems. Improving constituent connections requires staff with focused rather than broad policy portfolios. Creating alternative sources of information sharing and bipartisan connection means subsidizing congressional caucuses.

The solution goes beyond simply reversing the Gingrich revolution. First, Congress must invest in itself and the people who work there via the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act. Second, resources must be allocated in a way that strategically decentralizes power and increases funding to three groups of staff: rank-and-file offices, committee staff, and support agencies such as the Congressional Research Service and the Government Accountability Office. These allocations should reinforce stability by decoupling resources from partisan control and supporting retention of high-quality staff. Committee staff ratios should be equal, regardless of who is in the majority; cost-of-living adjustments for staff should be as consistent and competitive as they are for the rest of the federal government; and expansions in leadership resources should be automatically mirrored for the rank-and-file.

Congress has made some progress, such as paying interns, tweaking the formula for staff budgets, and in some Senate committees, institutionalizing consistent staff ratios. But these are reliant on wobbly norms and ultimately marginal. Purposeful reform requires bravery (or a discharge petition) by rank-and-file members to increase their own budgets, which Congress has avoided for years out of a fear that “voting for a pay raise” will hurt them in elections—an unfounded and costly apprehension. With the resources they do have, members can start by attending (and paying attention during) committee hearings, investing in policy staff, and relying on one another for information rather than party leaders.

Beneath the murky surface of polarization, gridlock, and demoralizing policy responsiveness is something simple: a lack of congressional capacity. As we ask Congress to control a huge bureaucracy and a powerful president, we need to support members that pursue investments in the First Branch. For Congress to fight back, it needs fighters—and boxing gloves—to stay in the match.