"We must make our political democracy a social democracy as well. Political democracy cannot last unless there lies at the base of it social democracy." (Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates, 25 November 1949)

"I have many critiques of capitalism. And I think ultimately, the definition for me of why I call myself a democratic socialist is the words of Dr. King decades ago. He said, call it democracy or call it democratic socialism. There must be a better distribution of wealth for all of god’s children in this country." (Zohran Mamdani, Interview)

The current crisis offers the chance of rethinking our political systems in a more fundamental way: How can we not just preserve, but improve our democracies? This is necessary not because the wrong people win, but because our democratic systems are too skewed by things that should not play a role in electoral success. First among these are wealth and status. Fixing this is our primary challenge – and it is here that the current crisis opens up room not just to tinker on the margins, but to build better societies.

Addressing this should have two components. The first involves improving access and voice in politics. The second involves breaking up concentrations of corporate power.

Start with the first. It means thinking about processes and institutions. It is about designing electoral systems and the powers of political parties, which remain the key vehicles of political participation and need to be strong enough to do their job. It should also involve strengthening other avenues for civic participation, as not everyone will want to join a political party. It is, unsurprisingly, also about how politics is funded, and about curbing the influence of insider networks and the distorting power of social media platforms. This is not just about money. Status, too, can become a problem when countries are run by a narrow group of people who come with their own prejudices and biases (see, e.g., Sandel). In the US, Ivy-League schools play a key role; in France the Grands Écoles; in the UK Oxbridge. But even in Germany, with a less elite university tradition, it seems notable that more than 80% of German parliamentarians have academic degrees. This elitism is a problem – and it feeds the sense of disconnect and powerlessness that has fueled the rise of the far-right in the US and elsewhere. Moreover, there are fewer and fewer spaces where people from different backgrounds routinely meet each other and interact, and sociologists have long emphasized the ill effects of this. We are cut off more than before from each other – and why would we trust those whom we don’t know?

My second point will be more controversial. The diagnosis of powerlessness has been tied in the literature on German authoritarianism to the neoliberal discourses and policy reforms of the 1990s (e.g. Heitmeyer). The constant emphasis on who is deserving (and thus on who is not), the decrease of social security safeguards, and the constraints (“Sachzwänge”) imposed on domestic politics by global capitalism and the resulting sense of political disempowerment have contributed to feelings of loss of orientation and insecurity that fuel the growth of authoritarian attitudes. Indeed, economic causes, in particular the effects of globalization, feature in many accounts explaining the rise of the far-right in the literature (see e.g. Rodrik). But independently of the correct diagnosis, it bears emphasizing that we live in a world today where we are often dependent on a few major corporations in our daily lives, at the same time that our political rules give their money significant leverage over politics. This leverage is even more dramatic for social media companies. Realizing democracy must mean breaking up concentrations of corporate power, it must mean progressive taxation, and it should mean opening some “private” spaces up to democratic principles instead of relying on a narrow formal understanding of freedom to isolate them from it.

All of this is a challenge for people in many fields, including constitutional law and its re-imagination. The US Constitution today is simply outdated. Its text has for too long overemphasized restraining governmental power – and even at this core function it currently seems to be failing. Many other constitutions today are much more aspirational and transformative, they include social rights, values and directives for the state. This is a good thing, but such provisions can at best be part of an answer to our problems. All too often, the political structures and institutions we have do not match the material promises encapsulated in those aspirational constitutions and in the rights they include. What we need, as Roberto Gargarella has argued, is not more rights, but a return to the engine room of politics. If we are to re-create our social democracies, we need a more open and a more equal politics: one whose system of power, not just its ritual of elections, is truly democratic.