The judiciary has been among the first targets in countries experiencing processes of democratic backsliding, where elected leaders point at the distance between the views of the “privileged judicial elites” vis-á-vis the needs of the “regular people.” This rhetoric is oftentimes mere democratic window-dressing to justify sweeping reforms to concentrate power in the executive branch and to propel a political project. But let us take at face value the alleged distance between judges and the society that they serve and consider a couple of ways that might reduce the gap: adjusting the length of tenure and electing judges.

Debates over judicial tenure pit independence against accountability. Total judicial independence risks lack of oversight, while total judicial accountability risks political pressure. The length of a judge’s tenure on the bench can serve as a regulator of the tension between these two desired judicial qualities.

Life tenure heightens the tension between judicial independence and accountability. Life tenure isolates judges from the noisy signals and pressures from everyday politics, allowing them to make decisions in line with their sincere evaluation of the facts and relevant laws without fear of retaliation from public or private actors. A secure stream of income for life also helps build a judiciary with officials devoted to developing an expert knowledge of the law and the craft of judging, helping them to resist more lucrative but perhaps less stable job opportunities.

On the other hand, life tenure complicates direct oversight of judges’ performance as well as the effectiveness of the options for checking the power of the judiciary. Life tenure not only isolates judges from politics but also from society. Limited turnover and generational renewability in the judiciary can have the effect of creating distance between judges and the public’s needs and a changing society. These shortcomings are more acute the younger the judges are appointed, as they may serve for three decades or more.

But tenure need not be for life. Judges can serve for a fixed term to ameliorate the trade-off. The length of a judge’s tenure on the bench can serve as a regulator of the tension between these two desired judicial qualities. How long should a fixed term be?  If tenure is too short, judges would face incentives to curry favor with both the current and the incoming government with an eye to their next employment goal. Their views on issues, therefore, will likely be unduly influenced by these parties’ preferences. Tenure should be enough to give judges a sufficiently long horizon so that independent behavior is incentivized. A judge’s tenure length should therefore be at least longer than their appointer’s tenure, but whether there is an optimal length is not clear. Some countries and U.S. states fix tenure at nine, twelve or fifteen years, aiming at striking the right balance between judicial independence and accountability.

The popular election of judges introduces an interesting element to the debate. Electing judges might bring them closer to public concerns, thus increasing accountability. Evidence from some U.S. states suggests that electing judges by popular vote produces a more ideologically diverse bench. Research on Bolivia’s High Courts also shows that elected judges are more sociologically diverse than appointed ones. Arguably, more open rules for participation and fewer requirements to become a candidate in judicial elections would bring more diversity to the bench and probably also better reflection of the society’s views and characteristics in judicial decisions.

Popular elections, however, bring their own risks for the judicial role. Fundraising, campaigning, and mobilizing the vote might dissuade some profiles from becoming judges and attract others. Mexican voters went to the polls on June 1, 2025 to elect half of all the federal judges: on average, when compared to career judges, elected judges have fewer years of practicing law, weaker academic credentials, and some had never set foot in a courtroom before the election. Moreover, impartial behavior on the bench might also be impaired by the commitments made during campaigns to the political parties or other actors who helped to secure an election victory, or biased in favor of the views of the voters who can determine the result of a re-election.

Arguably, the perils of electing judges could be reduced through the regulation of campaigns, the requirements to run for a judgeship, and of course the length of tenure of elected judges. Whereas life tenure for elected judges would eventually erode the accountability advantage of elections, tenure longer than those of other elected officials but short enough to allow for generational renewability of the judiciary might be well suited to strike an effective balance between independence and accountability. However, shorter tenures for elected judges imply more frequent elections and thus either the loss of accumulated judicial experience if reelection is not allowed, or more instances of biased judging in favor of those who can help secure re-election.

On the other hand, the requirements to become a candidate in judicial elections can be heightened including, for instance, passing an exam on basic jurisprudential trends, a certain number of years of legal work, or even previous experience in the judicial branch. Moreover, campaigns could also be more closely regulated and monitored so that the candidates’ expertise and capacity play a larger role in the election relative to the capacity to mobilize voters through clientelist networks or negative campaigns. These measures, however, would also reduce one of the benefits of more open and less constrained elections, namely the diversity of sociological profiles and ideological preferences that they can bring to the bench.

Addressing the gap between judges and society is critical in light of a mounting backlog of cases, decreasing levels of confidence in the judiciary, and the rise of leaders and parties capable and willing to undermine judicial independence and democratic checks and balances. Length of tenure and judicial elections are two instruments that can be used to bring judges, and the justice system, closer to the people. They are not without tradeoffs, as they may also reduce levels of judicial professionalism, expertise, and neutrality. Other instruments include the presence of lay judges, expanding accessibility to the justice system, and expanding the availability of alternative methods of dispute resolution. A combination of instruments might help strike a better balance of judicial independence and accountability.

Author’s Note: This entry is partly based on the author’s short video on “Should judges serve for life, fixed terms, of face the electorate” prepared for the Oxford Eplains series in the volume on Judicial Politics in the United States, coordinated by Christina L. Boyd and Lee Epstein.