Sep 21, 2026
Election Administration in 2026: Unprecedented (Again)
Tammy Patrick
Sep 21, 2026
Election Administration in 2026: Unprecedented (Again)
Tammy Patrick
Sep 21, 2026
Election Administration in 2026: Unprecedented (Again)
Tammy Patrick
Sep 21, 2026
Election Administration in 2026: Unprecedented (Again)
Tammy Patrick
Sep 21, 2026
Election Administration in 2026: Unprecedented (Again)
Tammy Patrick
Sep 21, 2026
Election Administration in 2026: Unprecedented (Again)
Tammy Patrick
Introduction: Everything Old is New Again
I often say that every election has a story to tell; that sometimes we don’t know what that story is until long after the last vote has been counted. For the last two decades, election administration has responded to each of the latest “unprecedented” situations to ensure that the Great Experiment comes out stronger on the other side. The 2026 Midterms will be no different (I hope) in that outcome, but we need to acknowledge major changes happening in our election ecosystem. First, a quick primer on the election administration landscape. Then we'll review the typical election topics that surface every election and discuss how they are different this time around.
Elections are administered at the state and local level. Roughly half of the local officials are themselves elected; the other half are appointed or hired. In some states, the work is consolidated into a single office, like in Florida, where Supervisors of Elections handle all election functions. Other states, like Alabama, divide the administration across a handful of agencies; the board of registrars handles voter registration, circuit clerks oversee absentee/vote by mail, and probate judges administer in-person voting, tabulation, and the canvass. Given the distribution of election responsibilities across local government, it is clear why 34% of our election offices do not have a full-time election administrator — most often they serve their communities in many other ways in addition to their election duties. The number of local offices may range from as few as fifteen, such as in Arizona, where administration is done at the county level, to states like Michigan or Wisconsin with hundreds of local offices because administration is done at the municipal and township level. This patchwork of responsibilities accounts for 75% of our election offices serving just 8% of the nation’s voters, while 8% of the offices, our large urban centers, serve 75% of the electorate. This state-specific structure has evolved over the last 250 years with lateral local oversight by bipartisan officials in different roles, transparent processes open to observation by the public and press, and vertical oversight by the state’s designated chief election authority and the courts.
Redistricting
Redistricting is typically done after the decennial census, every ten years. Leading into the 2026 election cycle, a number of states decided to redraw their lines mid-decade. Although this was not the first time mid-decennial redistricting has happened, it was not uncommon in the 19th century but rare in the 20th; since the summer of 2025, ten states have sought to change their districts for the 2026 midterm election. Some states have successfully implemented these new lines while others have been at the mercy of 11th hour decisions by the courts. Districts not only determine which office a candidate is running for, but also voter eligibility; that eligibility drives most election administrative functions such as how many ballots to order, workers to hire, and where to place polling locations.
Claims of Fraud
Each election cycle, we see old political schemes resurface as partisan actors try to exert outsized influence on election outcomes. Election officials, the “referees” in the election, must pivot to secure the process from outside manipulation and maintain its integrity and legitimacy. Historically, the rare instances of fraud have been less impactful than the claims of widespread fraud suggest; claiming voting systems are susceptible to hacking and rigging is easier, cheaper, and more fruitful than attempting such criminal activity. Given online platforms and the sophistication of AI, misinformation spreads more easily and is more convincing than ever. No studies, court rulings, or criminal convictions support claims about the impact of voter fraud; yet the rhetoric continues to drive policy proposals and a seismic shift among election authorities.
Federal Involvement Shift (and What It Means for Election Officials)
The United States Constitution makes it clear that state and local governments conduct elections under their state-specific statutes and, on occasion, Congress weighs in on federal election requirements. This year, we have seen executive orders and new directives to the Department of Justice, Homeland Security, and the United States Postal Service on election administration. Many election officials feel that the collaborative relationships they previously relied on have, at best, dissolved and at worst become contentious and adversarial.
Department of Justice
Over the last year, the Department of Justice, specifically the Civil Rights Division, has seen a sea change in both personnel and direction. Gone is the historic posture of championing the protection of voters' civil rights to participate in the franchise; there is criticism that the Department is now being used to support unproven fraud conspiracies that have plagued us for the last decade. This effort includes the demand for state voter rolls and resulting litigation, increased election observation, and the criminalization of election administration errors.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Administration (CISA)
Similarly, since early 2025, CISA’s engagement with election administrators has diminished commensurate with their reduction in staffing dedicated to that effort. Election officials at the state and local level had come to appreciate the partnership with CISA to conduct tabletop exercises, security reviews of their cyber and physical postures, and provide training materials and briefings around ongoing threat actors. Good government organizations and nonprofits have stepped into the gap left by this exit, but they typically lack the same access to actionable intelligence, and many states have private funding prohibitions that prevent election officials from accessing their services or materials.
United States Postal Service (USPS)
The Postal Service role has historically been to collect and deliver election mail; Executive Order #14399 sought to change that and insert USPS as a gatekeeper for Americans seeking to vote by mail/absentee. The Postal Rule, in response to the Executive Order, would make former recommendations around envelope design, tracking, and automation compatibility mandatory requirements, create a concerning federal list of voters, and require USPS to reject entire mailings tendered to them from election officials if even a single mail piece in the mailing did not comply with the new requirements, with a zero-tolerance level for any mistakes or omissions. Election officials have seen relief by the Supreme Court in implementing the rule for this election but will still need to assure voters that absentee and voting by mail is as safe and secure as ever.
Insider Threats
Concerns over undue influence in our elections are one reason the process is transparent and has multiple layers of oversight and verification. This election will be different in that there are a number of officials who have run and been elected on the notion that the 2020 election was stolen. These individuals, who deny the legitimacy of that election, are now in positions of authority. For some, being in office and learning about the safeguards and measures taken to secure the process has been illuminating and humbling. Others continue to espouse conspiracy theories.
Conclusion: Individuals and Institutions
For 250 years our institutions have held because of the dedication and efforts of individuals who take their oaths of office seriously — regardless of the latest obstacle, the newest twist in the plot. The election professionals who have devoted their careers to ensuring that eligible voters have unencumbered access to the ballot box remain steadfast and voters should have confidence in exercising their right to vote.
Introduction: Everything Old is New Again
I often say that every election has a story to tell; that sometimes we don’t know what that story is until long after the last vote has been counted. For the last two decades, election administration has responded to each of the latest “unprecedented” situations to ensure that the Great Experiment comes out stronger on the other side. The 2026 Midterms will be no different (I hope) in that outcome, but we need to acknowledge major changes happening in our election ecosystem. First, a quick primer on the election administration landscape. Then we'll review the typical election topics that surface every election and discuss how they are different this time around.
Elections are administered at the state and local level. Roughly half of the local officials are themselves elected; the other half are appointed or hired. In some states, the work is consolidated into a single office, like in Florida, where Supervisors of Elections handle all election functions. Other states, like Alabama, divide the administration across a handful of agencies; the board of registrars handles voter registration, circuit clerks oversee absentee/vote by mail, and probate judges administer in-person voting, tabulation, and the canvass. Given the distribution of election responsibilities across local government, it is clear why 34% of our election offices do not have a full-time election administrator — most often they serve their communities in many other ways in addition to their election duties. The number of local offices may range from as few as fifteen, such as in Arizona, where administration is done at the county level, to states like Michigan or Wisconsin with hundreds of local offices because administration is done at the municipal and township level. This patchwork of responsibilities accounts for 75% of our election offices serving just 8% of the nation’s voters, while 8% of the offices, our large urban centers, serve 75% of the electorate. This state-specific structure has evolved over the last 250 years with lateral local oversight by bipartisan officials in different roles, transparent processes open to observation by the public and press, and vertical oversight by the state’s designated chief election authority and the courts.
Redistricting
Redistricting is typically done after the decennial census, every ten years. Leading into the 2026 election cycle, a number of states decided to redraw their lines mid-decade. Although this was not the first time mid-decennial redistricting has happened, it was not uncommon in the 19th century but rare in the 20th; since the summer of 2025, ten states have sought to change their districts for the 2026 midterm election. Some states have successfully implemented these new lines while others have been at the mercy of 11th hour decisions by the courts. Districts not only determine which office a candidate is running for, but also voter eligibility; that eligibility drives most election administrative functions such as how many ballots to order, workers to hire, and where to place polling locations.
Claims of Fraud
Each election cycle, we see old political schemes resurface as partisan actors try to exert outsized influence on election outcomes. Election officials, the “referees” in the election, must pivot to secure the process from outside manipulation and maintain its integrity and legitimacy. Historically, the rare instances of fraud have been less impactful than the claims of widespread fraud suggest; claiming voting systems are susceptible to hacking and rigging is easier, cheaper, and more fruitful than attempting such criminal activity. Given online platforms and the sophistication of AI, misinformation spreads more easily and is more convincing than ever. No studies, court rulings, or criminal convictions support claims about the impact of voter fraud; yet the rhetoric continues to drive policy proposals and a seismic shift among election authorities.
Federal Involvement Shift (and What It Means for Election Officials)
The United States Constitution makes it clear that state and local governments conduct elections under their state-specific statutes and, on occasion, Congress weighs in on federal election requirements. This year, we have seen executive orders and new directives to the Department of Justice, Homeland Security, and the United States Postal Service on election administration. Many election officials feel that the collaborative relationships they previously relied on have, at best, dissolved and at worst become contentious and adversarial.
Department of Justice
Over the last year, the Department of Justice, specifically the Civil Rights Division, has seen a sea change in both personnel and direction. Gone is the historic posture of championing the protection of voters' civil rights to participate in the franchise; there is criticism that the Department is now being used to support unproven fraud conspiracies that have plagued us for the last decade. This effort includes the demand for state voter rolls and resulting litigation, increased election observation, and the criminalization of election administration errors.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Administration (CISA)
Similarly, since early 2025, CISA’s engagement with election administrators has diminished commensurate with their reduction in staffing dedicated to that effort. Election officials at the state and local level had come to appreciate the partnership with CISA to conduct tabletop exercises, security reviews of their cyber and physical postures, and provide training materials and briefings around ongoing threat actors. Good government organizations and nonprofits have stepped into the gap left by this exit, but they typically lack the same access to actionable intelligence, and many states have private funding prohibitions that prevent election officials from accessing their services or materials.
United States Postal Service (USPS)
The Postal Service role has historically been to collect and deliver election mail; Executive Order #14399 sought to change that and insert USPS as a gatekeeper for Americans seeking to vote by mail/absentee. The Postal Rule, in response to the Executive Order, would make former recommendations around envelope design, tracking, and automation compatibility mandatory requirements, create a concerning federal list of voters, and require USPS to reject entire mailings tendered to them from election officials if even a single mail piece in the mailing did not comply with the new requirements, with a zero-tolerance level for any mistakes or omissions. Election officials have seen relief by the Supreme Court in implementing the rule for this election but will still need to assure voters that absentee and voting by mail is as safe and secure as ever.
Insider Threats
Concerns over undue influence in our elections are one reason the process is transparent and has multiple layers of oversight and verification. This election will be different in that there are a number of officials who have run and been elected on the notion that the 2020 election was stolen. These individuals, who deny the legitimacy of that election, are now in positions of authority. For some, being in office and learning about the safeguards and measures taken to secure the process has been illuminating and humbling. Others continue to espouse conspiracy theories.
Conclusion: Individuals and Institutions
For 250 years our institutions have held because of the dedication and efforts of individuals who take their oaths of office seriously — regardless of the latest obstacle, the newest twist in the plot. The election professionals who have devoted their careers to ensuring that eligible voters have unencumbered access to the ballot box remain steadfast and voters should have confidence in exercising their right to vote.
Introduction: Everything Old is New Again
I often say that every election has a story to tell; that sometimes we don’t know what that story is until long after the last vote has been counted. For the last two decades, election administration has responded to each of the latest “unprecedented” situations to ensure that the Great Experiment comes out stronger on the other side. The 2026 Midterms will be no different (I hope) in that outcome, but we need to acknowledge major changes happening in our election ecosystem. First, a quick primer on the election administration landscape. Then we'll review the typical election topics that surface every election and discuss how they are different this time around.
Elections are administered at the state and local level. Roughly half of the local officials are themselves elected; the other half are appointed or hired. In some states, the work is consolidated into a single office, like in Florida, where Supervisors of Elections handle all election functions. Other states, like Alabama, divide the administration across a handful of agencies; the board of registrars handles voter registration, circuit clerks oversee absentee/vote by mail, and probate judges administer in-person voting, tabulation, and the canvass. Given the distribution of election responsibilities across local government, it is clear why 34% of our election offices do not have a full-time election administrator — most often they serve their communities in many other ways in addition to their election duties. The number of local offices may range from as few as fifteen, such as in Arizona, where administration is done at the county level, to states like Michigan or Wisconsin with hundreds of local offices because administration is done at the municipal and township level. This patchwork of responsibilities accounts for 75% of our election offices serving just 8% of the nation’s voters, while 8% of the offices, our large urban centers, serve 75% of the electorate. This state-specific structure has evolved over the last 250 years with lateral local oversight by bipartisan officials in different roles, transparent processes open to observation by the public and press, and vertical oversight by the state’s designated chief election authority and the courts.
Redistricting
Redistricting is typically done after the decennial census, every ten years. Leading into the 2026 election cycle, a number of states decided to redraw their lines mid-decade. Although this was not the first time mid-decennial redistricting has happened, it was not uncommon in the 19th century but rare in the 20th; since the summer of 2025, ten states have sought to change their districts for the 2026 midterm election. Some states have successfully implemented these new lines while others have been at the mercy of 11th hour decisions by the courts. Districts not only determine which office a candidate is running for, but also voter eligibility; that eligibility drives most election administrative functions such as how many ballots to order, workers to hire, and where to place polling locations.
Claims of Fraud
Each election cycle, we see old political schemes resurface as partisan actors try to exert outsized influence on election outcomes. Election officials, the “referees” in the election, must pivot to secure the process from outside manipulation and maintain its integrity and legitimacy. Historically, the rare instances of fraud have been less impactful than the claims of widespread fraud suggest; claiming voting systems are susceptible to hacking and rigging is easier, cheaper, and more fruitful than attempting such criminal activity. Given online platforms and the sophistication of AI, misinformation spreads more easily and is more convincing than ever. No studies, court rulings, or criminal convictions support claims about the impact of voter fraud; yet the rhetoric continues to drive policy proposals and a seismic shift among election authorities.
Federal Involvement Shift (and What It Means for Election Officials)
The United States Constitution makes it clear that state and local governments conduct elections under their state-specific statutes and, on occasion, Congress weighs in on federal election requirements. This year, we have seen executive orders and new directives to the Department of Justice, Homeland Security, and the United States Postal Service on election administration. Many election officials feel that the collaborative relationships they previously relied on have, at best, dissolved and at worst become contentious and adversarial.
Department of Justice
Over the last year, the Department of Justice, specifically the Civil Rights Division, has seen a sea change in both personnel and direction. Gone is the historic posture of championing the protection of voters' civil rights to participate in the franchise; there is criticism that the Department is now being used to support unproven fraud conspiracies that have plagued us for the last decade. This effort includes the demand for state voter rolls and resulting litigation, increased election observation, and the criminalization of election administration errors.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Administration (CISA)
Similarly, since early 2025, CISA’s engagement with election administrators has diminished commensurate with their reduction in staffing dedicated to that effort. Election officials at the state and local level had come to appreciate the partnership with CISA to conduct tabletop exercises, security reviews of their cyber and physical postures, and provide training materials and briefings around ongoing threat actors. Good government organizations and nonprofits have stepped into the gap left by this exit, but they typically lack the same access to actionable intelligence, and many states have private funding prohibitions that prevent election officials from accessing their services or materials.
United States Postal Service (USPS)
The Postal Service role has historically been to collect and deliver election mail; Executive Order #14399 sought to change that and insert USPS as a gatekeeper for Americans seeking to vote by mail/absentee. The Postal Rule, in response to the Executive Order, would make former recommendations around envelope design, tracking, and automation compatibility mandatory requirements, create a concerning federal list of voters, and require USPS to reject entire mailings tendered to them from election officials if even a single mail piece in the mailing did not comply with the new requirements, with a zero-tolerance level for any mistakes or omissions. Election officials have seen relief by the Supreme Court in implementing the rule for this election but will still need to assure voters that absentee and voting by mail is as safe and secure as ever.
Insider Threats
Concerns over undue influence in our elections are one reason the process is transparent and has multiple layers of oversight and verification. This election will be different in that there are a number of officials who have run and been elected on the notion that the 2020 election was stolen. These individuals, who deny the legitimacy of that election, are now in positions of authority. For some, being in office and learning about the safeguards and measures taken to secure the process has been illuminating and humbling. Others continue to espouse conspiracy theories.
Conclusion: Individuals and Institutions
For 250 years our institutions have held because of the dedication and efforts of individuals who take their oaths of office seriously — regardless of the latest obstacle, the newest twist in the plot. The election professionals who have devoted their careers to ensuring that eligible voters have unencumbered access to the ballot box remain steadfast and voters should have confidence in exercising their right to vote.
Introduction: Everything Old is New Again
I often say that every election has a story to tell; that sometimes we don’t know what that story is until long after the last vote has been counted. For the last two decades, election administration has responded to each of the latest “unprecedented” situations to ensure that the Great Experiment comes out stronger on the other side. The 2026 Midterms will be no different (I hope) in that outcome, but we need to acknowledge major changes happening in our election ecosystem. First, a quick primer on the election administration landscape. Then we'll review the typical election topics that surface every election and discuss how they are different this time around.
Elections are administered at the state and local level. Roughly half of the local officials are themselves elected; the other half are appointed or hired. In some states, the work is consolidated into a single office, like in Florida, where Supervisors of Elections handle all election functions. Other states, like Alabama, divide the administration across a handful of agencies; the board of registrars handles voter registration, circuit clerks oversee absentee/vote by mail, and probate judges administer in-person voting, tabulation, and the canvass. Given the distribution of election responsibilities across local government, it is clear why 34% of our election offices do not have a full-time election administrator — most often they serve their communities in many other ways in addition to their election duties. The number of local offices may range from as few as fifteen, such as in Arizona, where administration is done at the county level, to states like Michigan or Wisconsin with hundreds of local offices because administration is done at the municipal and township level. This patchwork of responsibilities accounts for 75% of our election offices serving just 8% of the nation’s voters, while 8% of the offices, our large urban centers, serve 75% of the electorate. This state-specific structure has evolved over the last 250 years with lateral local oversight by bipartisan officials in different roles, transparent processes open to observation by the public and press, and vertical oversight by the state’s designated chief election authority and the courts.
Redistricting
Redistricting is typically done after the decennial census, every ten years. Leading into the 2026 election cycle, a number of states decided to redraw their lines mid-decade. Although this was not the first time mid-decennial redistricting has happened, it was not uncommon in the 19th century but rare in the 20th; since the summer of 2025, ten states have sought to change their districts for the 2026 midterm election. Some states have successfully implemented these new lines while others have been at the mercy of 11th hour decisions by the courts. Districts not only determine which office a candidate is running for, but also voter eligibility; that eligibility drives most election administrative functions such as how many ballots to order, workers to hire, and where to place polling locations.
Claims of Fraud
Each election cycle, we see old political schemes resurface as partisan actors try to exert outsized influence on election outcomes. Election officials, the “referees” in the election, must pivot to secure the process from outside manipulation and maintain its integrity and legitimacy. Historically, the rare instances of fraud have been less impactful than the claims of widespread fraud suggest; claiming voting systems are susceptible to hacking and rigging is easier, cheaper, and more fruitful than attempting such criminal activity. Given online platforms and the sophistication of AI, misinformation spreads more easily and is more convincing than ever. No studies, court rulings, or criminal convictions support claims about the impact of voter fraud; yet the rhetoric continues to drive policy proposals and a seismic shift among election authorities.
Federal Involvement Shift (and What It Means for Election Officials)
The United States Constitution makes it clear that state and local governments conduct elections under their state-specific statutes and, on occasion, Congress weighs in on federal election requirements. This year, we have seen executive orders and new directives to the Department of Justice, Homeland Security, and the United States Postal Service on election administration. Many election officials feel that the collaborative relationships they previously relied on have, at best, dissolved and at worst become contentious and adversarial.
Department of Justice
Over the last year, the Department of Justice, specifically the Civil Rights Division, has seen a sea change in both personnel and direction. Gone is the historic posture of championing the protection of voters' civil rights to participate in the franchise; there is criticism that the Department is now being used to support unproven fraud conspiracies that have plagued us for the last decade. This effort includes the demand for state voter rolls and resulting litigation, increased election observation, and the criminalization of election administration errors.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Administration (CISA)
Similarly, since early 2025, CISA’s engagement with election administrators has diminished commensurate with their reduction in staffing dedicated to that effort. Election officials at the state and local level had come to appreciate the partnership with CISA to conduct tabletop exercises, security reviews of their cyber and physical postures, and provide training materials and briefings around ongoing threat actors. Good government organizations and nonprofits have stepped into the gap left by this exit, but they typically lack the same access to actionable intelligence, and many states have private funding prohibitions that prevent election officials from accessing their services or materials.
United States Postal Service (USPS)
The Postal Service role has historically been to collect and deliver election mail; Executive Order #14399 sought to change that and insert USPS as a gatekeeper for Americans seeking to vote by mail/absentee. The Postal Rule, in response to the Executive Order, would make former recommendations around envelope design, tracking, and automation compatibility mandatory requirements, create a concerning federal list of voters, and require USPS to reject entire mailings tendered to them from election officials if even a single mail piece in the mailing did not comply with the new requirements, with a zero-tolerance level for any mistakes or omissions. Election officials have seen relief by the Supreme Court in implementing the rule for this election but will still need to assure voters that absentee and voting by mail is as safe and secure as ever.
Insider Threats
Concerns over undue influence in our elections are one reason the process is transparent and has multiple layers of oversight and verification. This election will be different in that there are a number of officials who have run and been elected on the notion that the 2020 election was stolen. These individuals, who deny the legitimacy of that election, are now in positions of authority. For some, being in office and learning about the safeguards and measures taken to secure the process has been illuminating and humbling. Others continue to espouse conspiracy theories.
Conclusion: Individuals and Institutions
For 250 years our institutions have held because of the dedication and efforts of individuals who take their oaths of office seriously — regardless of the latest obstacle, the newest twist in the plot. The election professionals who have devoted their careers to ensuring that eligible voters have unencumbered access to the ballot box remain steadfast and voters should have confidence in exercising their right to vote.
Introduction: Everything Old is New Again
I often say that every election has a story to tell; that sometimes we don’t know what that story is until long after the last vote has been counted. For the last two decades, election administration has responded to each of the latest “unprecedented” situations to ensure that the Great Experiment comes out stronger on the other side. The 2026 Midterms will be no different (I hope) in that outcome, but we need to acknowledge major changes happening in our election ecosystem. First, a quick primer on the election administration landscape. Then we'll review the typical election topics that surface every election and discuss how they are different this time around.
Elections are administered at the state and local level. Roughly half of the local officials are themselves elected; the other half are appointed or hired. In some states, the work is consolidated into a single office, like in Florida, where Supervisors of Elections handle all election functions. Other states, like Alabama, divide the administration across a handful of agencies; the board of registrars handles voter registration, circuit clerks oversee absentee/vote by mail, and probate judges administer in-person voting, tabulation, and the canvass. Given the distribution of election responsibilities across local government, it is clear why 34% of our election offices do not have a full-time election administrator — most often they serve their communities in many other ways in addition to their election duties. The number of local offices may range from as few as fifteen, such as in Arizona, where administration is done at the county level, to states like Michigan or Wisconsin with hundreds of local offices because administration is done at the municipal and township level. This patchwork of responsibilities accounts for 75% of our election offices serving just 8% of the nation’s voters, while 8% of the offices, our large urban centers, serve 75% of the electorate. This state-specific structure has evolved over the last 250 years with lateral local oversight by bipartisan officials in different roles, transparent processes open to observation by the public and press, and vertical oversight by the state’s designated chief election authority and the courts.
Redistricting
Redistricting is typically done after the decennial census, every ten years. Leading into the 2026 election cycle, a number of states decided to redraw their lines mid-decade. Although this was not the first time mid-decennial redistricting has happened, it was not uncommon in the 19th century but rare in the 20th; since the summer of 2025, ten states have sought to change their districts for the 2026 midterm election. Some states have successfully implemented these new lines while others have been at the mercy of 11th hour decisions by the courts. Districts not only determine which office a candidate is running for, but also voter eligibility; that eligibility drives most election administrative functions such as how many ballots to order, workers to hire, and where to place polling locations.
Claims of Fraud
Each election cycle, we see old political schemes resurface as partisan actors try to exert outsized influence on election outcomes. Election officials, the “referees” in the election, must pivot to secure the process from outside manipulation and maintain its integrity and legitimacy. Historically, the rare instances of fraud have been less impactful than the claims of widespread fraud suggest; claiming voting systems are susceptible to hacking and rigging is easier, cheaper, and more fruitful than attempting such criminal activity. Given online platforms and the sophistication of AI, misinformation spreads more easily and is more convincing than ever. No studies, court rulings, or criminal convictions support claims about the impact of voter fraud; yet the rhetoric continues to drive policy proposals and a seismic shift among election authorities.
Federal Involvement Shift (and What It Means for Election Officials)
The United States Constitution makes it clear that state and local governments conduct elections under their state-specific statutes and, on occasion, Congress weighs in on federal election requirements. This year, we have seen executive orders and new directives to the Department of Justice, Homeland Security, and the United States Postal Service on election administration. Many election officials feel that the collaborative relationships they previously relied on have, at best, dissolved and at worst become contentious and adversarial.
Department of Justice
Over the last year, the Department of Justice, specifically the Civil Rights Division, has seen a sea change in both personnel and direction. Gone is the historic posture of championing the protection of voters' civil rights to participate in the franchise; there is criticism that the Department is now being used to support unproven fraud conspiracies that have plagued us for the last decade. This effort includes the demand for state voter rolls and resulting litigation, increased election observation, and the criminalization of election administration errors.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Administration (CISA)
Similarly, since early 2025, CISA’s engagement with election administrators has diminished commensurate with their reduction in staffing dedicated to that effort. Election officials at the state and local level had come to appreciate the partnership with CISA to conduct tabletop exercises, security reviews of their cyber and physical postures, and provide training materials and briefings around ongoing threat actors. Good government organizations and nonprofits have stepped into the gap left by this exit, but they typically lack the same access to actionable intelligence, and many states have private funding prohibitions that prevent election officials from accessing their services or materials.
United States Postal Service (USPS)
The Postal Service role has historically been to collect and deliver election mail; Executive Order #14399 sought to change that and insert USPS as a gatekeeper for Americans seeking to vote by mail/absentee. The Postal Rule, in response to the Executive Order, would make former recommendations around envelope design, tracking, and automation compatibility mandatory requirements, create a concerning federal list of voters, and require USPS to reject entire mailings tendered to them from election officials if even a single mail piece in the mailing did not comply with the new requirements, with a zero-tolerance level for any mistakes or omissions. Election officials have seen relief by the Supreme Court in implementing the rule for this election but will still need to assure voters that absentee and voting by mail is as safe and secure as ever.
Insider Threats
Concerns over undue influence in our elections are one reason the process is transparent and has multiple layers of oversight and verification. This election will be different in that there are a number of officials who have run and been elected on the notion that the 2020 election was stolen. These individuals, who deny the legitimacy of that election, are now in positions of authority. For some, being in office and learning about the safeguards and measures taken to secure the process has been illuminating and humbling. Others continue to espouse conspiracy theories.
Conclusion: Individuals and Institutions
For 250 years our institutions have held because of the dedication and efforts of individuals who take their oaths of office seriously — regardless of the latest obstacle, the newest twist in the plot. The election professionals who have devoted their careers to ensuring that eligible voters have unencumbered access to the ballot box remain steadfast and voters should have confidence in exercising their right to vote.
Introduction: Everything Old is New Again
I often say that every election has a story to tell; that sometimes we don’t know what that story is until long after the last vote has been counted. For the last two decades, election administration has responded to each of the latest “unprecedented” situations to ensure that the Great Experiment comes out stronger on the other side. The 2026 Midterms will be no different (I hope) in that outcome, but we need to acknowledge major changes happening in our election ecosystem. First, a quick primer on the election administration landscape. Then we'll review the typical election topics that surface every election and discuss how they are different this time around.
Elections are administered at the state and local level. Roughly half of the local officials are themselves elected; the other half are appointed or hired. In some states, the work is consolidated into a single office, like in Florida, where Supervisors of Elections handle all election functions. Other states, like Alabama, divide the administration across a handful of agencies; the board of registrars handles voter registration, circuit clerks oversee absentee/vote by mail, and probate judges administer in-person voting, tabulation, and the canvass. Given the distribution of election responsibilities across local government, it is clear why 34% of our election offices do not have a full-time election administrator — most often they serve their communities in many other ways in addition to their election duties. The number of local offices may range from as few as fifteen, such as in Arizona, where administration is done at the county level, to states like Michigan or Wisconsin with hundreds of local offices because administration is done at the municipal and township level. This patchwork of responsibilities accounts for 75% of our election offices serving just 8% of the nation’s voters, while 8% of the offices, our large urban centers, serve 75% of the electorate. This state-specific structure has evolved over the last 250 years with lateral local oversight by bipartisan officials in different roles, transparent processes open to observation by the public and press, and vertical oversight by the state’s designated chief election authority and the courts.
Redistricting
Redistricting is typically done after the decennial census, every ten years. Leading into the 2026 election cycle, a number of states decided to redraw their lines mid-decade. Although this was not the first time mid-decennial redistricting has happened, it was not uncommon in the 19th century but rare in the 20th; since the summer of 2025, ten states have sought to change their districts for the 2026 midterm election. Some states have successfully implemented these new lines while others have been at the mercy of 11th hour decisions by the courts. Districts not only determine which office a candidate is running for, but also voter eligibility; that eligibility drives most election administrative functions such as how many ballots to order, workers to hire, and where to place polling locations.
Claims of Fraud
Each election cycle, we see old political schemes resurface as partisan actors try to exert outsized influence on election outcomes. Election officials, the “referees” in the election, must pivot to secure the process from outside manipulation and maintain its integrity and legitimacy. Historically, the rare instances of fraud have been less impactful than the claims of widespread fraud suggest; claiming voting systems are susceptible to hacking and rigging is easier, cheaper, and more fruitful than attempting such criminal activity. Given online platforms and the sophistication of AI, misinformation spreads more easily and is more convincing than ever. No studies, court rulings, or criminal convictions support claims about the impact of voter fraud; yet the rhetoric continues to drive policy proposals and a seismic shift among election authorities.
Federal Involvement Shift (and What It Means for Election Officials)
The United States Constitution makes it clear that state and local governments conduct elections under their state-specific statutes and, on occasion, Congress weighs in on federal election requirements. This year, we have seen executive orders and new directives to the Department of Justice, Homeland Security, and the United States Postal Service on election administration. Many election officials feel that the collaborative relationships they previously relied on have, at best, dissolved and at worst become contentious and adversarial.
Department of Justice
Over the last year, the Department of Justice, specifically the Civil Rights Division, has seen a sea change in both personnel and direction. Gone is the historic posture of championing the protection of voters' civil rights to participate in the franchise; there is criticism that the Department is now being used to support unproven fraud conspiracies that have plagued us for the last decade. This effort includes the demand for state voter rolls and resulting litigation, increased election observation, and the criminalization of election administration errors.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Administration (CISA)
Similarly, since early 2025, CISA’s engagement with election administrators has diminished commensurate with their reduction in staffing dedicated to that effort. Election officials at the state and local level had come to appreciate the partnership with CISA to conduct tabletop exercises, security reviews of their cyber and physical postures, and provide training materials and briefings around ongoing threat actors. Good government organizations and nonprofits have stepped into the gap left by this exit, but they typically lack the same access to actionable intelligence, and many states have private funding prohibitions that prevent election officials from accessing their services or materials.
United States Postal Service (USPS)
The Postal Service role has historically been to collect and deliver election mail; Executive Order #14399 sought to change that and insert USPS as a gatekeeper for Americans seeking to vote by mail/absentee. The Postal Rule, in response to the Executive Order, would make former recommendations around envelope design, tracking, and automation compatibility mandatory requirements, create a concerning federal list of voters, and require USPS to reject entire mailings tendered to them from election officials if even a single mail piece in the mailing did not comply with the new requirements, with a zero-tolerance level for any mistakes or omissions. Election officials have seen relief by the Supreme Court in implementing the rule for this election but will still need to assure voters that absentee and voting by mail is as safe and secure as ever.
Insider Threats
Concerns over undue influence in our elections are one reason the process is transparent and has multiple layers of oversight and verification. This election will be different in that there are a number of officials who have run and been elected on the notion that the 2020 election was stolen. These individuals, who deny the legitimacy of that election, are now in positions of authority. For some, being in office and learning about the safeguards and measures taken to secure the process has been illuminating and humbling. Others continue to espouse conspiracy theories.
Conclusion: Individuals and Institutions
For 250 years our institutions have held because of the dedication and efforts of individuals who take their oaths of office seriously — regardless of the latest obstacle, the newest twist in the plot. The election professionals who have devoted their careers to ensuring that eligible voters have unencumbered access to the ballot box remain steadfast and voters should have confidence in exercising their right to vote.
About the Author
Tammy Patrick
Tammy Patrick, CERA, is the Chief Program Officer at the Election Center, the National Association of Election Officials. Patrick has been working in the election administration space since 2003. In 2013 Patrick was selected by President Obama to serve as a commissioner on the Presidential Commission on Election Administration (PCEA), which led to a position at the Bipartisan Policy Center to further the work of the PCEA. Prior to that, she was the Federal Compliance Officer for Maricopa County Elections Department for eleven years. She has been an adjunct professor at the University of Minnesota since 2016.
About the Author
Tammy Patrick
Tammy Patrick, CERA, is the Chief Program Officer at the Election Center, the National Association of Election Officials. Patrick has been working in the election administration space since 2003. In 2013 Patrick was selected by President Obama to serve as a commissioner on the Presidential Commission on Election Administration (PCEA), which led to a position at the Bipartisan Policy Center to further the work of the PCEA. Prior to that, she was the Federal Compliance Officer for Maricopa County Elections Department for eleven years. She has been an adjunct professor at the University of Minnesota since 2016.
About the Author
Tammy Patrick
Tammy Patrick, CERA, is the Chief Program Officer at the Election Center, the National Association of Election Officials. Patrick has been working in the election administration space since 2003. In 2013 Patrick was selected by President Obama to serve as a commissioner on the Presidential Commission on Election Administration (PCEA), which led to a position at the Bipartisan Policy Center to further the work of the PCEA. Prior to that, she was the Federal Compliance Officer for Maricopa County Elections Department for eleven years. She has been an adjunct professor at the University of Minnesota since 2016.
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