America has a recount problem. State recount laws too often invite costly, unnecessary delays that undermine confidence in elections without changing outcomes. Losing candidates prolong the contest and sell false hope in fundraising pleas. States should amend their laws to significantly narrow the circumstances in which recounts take place.
A recount is a blunt instrument. It requires all ballots in a state or a district to be re-examined, a time-consuming process. A statewide recount can cost the state millions of dollars at a time when election officials are already exhausted from having run an election. And in the contemporary era, the canvass of votes is highly accurate. Optical scan machines are extremely accurate at tabulating votes on hand-marked ballots.
Recounts rarely change the outcome of an election, and it only happens in the closest of contests. In a recount, errors tend to be equitably distributed between candidates. That means both candidates tend to gain or lose votes during the recount. Only if the losing candidate can systematically gain votes can the losing candidate win. And those circumstances are rare.
The result didn’t change when Bob Casey dragged out his loss in the Pennsylvania election in 2024 after he lost by 0.22 percentage points. Nor when Donald Trump sought a recount in 2020 after losing the presidential election in Georgia by a similar margin. In fact, it’s almost impossible to find a recount change a result—and when it does, it’s because the margin is less than 0.1%.
If recounts are unlikely to change outcomes, states should focus on better ways that election systems can ensure accuracy.
One such mechanism is the administrative recount. When an election official detects a problem in a specific location, she can order a hand count in that precinct or county. Michigan employed this device in 2020, when the unofficial results in Antrim County revealed an error in the tabulation machine programming. After the error was corrected, a hand count confirmed the results. But the entire state avoided a burdensome recount because of the mistakes in one specific county. And the results can be amended if the administrative recount identifies a mistake.
Another is the audit. Some states randomly choose a handful of precincts to perform a hand tally and ensure that the results match the machine tally. Others use a more sophisticated device, the risk-limiting audit. That audit uses a statistical analysis to determine the number of ballots to check to ensure the apparent winner is the actual winner. The narrower the election, the more ballots are inspected to identify if there are discrepancies that might change the results.
States often have election contest statutes, where a candidate can formally contest the results in court if there was systematic fraud or suppression. This legal mechanism to challenge the results of an election can also occur regardless of a recount.
States should lean on these other devices to ensure the results of an election are accurate, and they should look to reform their recount laws.
First, a recount should only be triggered if the margin of victory is 0.1% of the total votes cast or 10 votes, whichever is larger, or in the event of a tie. This limit ensures that only recounts with a realistic chance of altering the outcome can occur. States like Pennsylvania have a limit five times higher, which sweeps in far more elections—and situations in which the recount is pointless.
Second, recounts should be automatic. Candidates sometimes get blamed for being sore losers when they request recounts. But if the margin is close enough to merit a recount, the law should simply require a recount.
Third, a recount should use the same method as the original count. If ballots are counted by a machine, they should be recounted by a machine. Hand counts are less accurate, more costly, and time consuming. Hand counts instead should be limited to administrative recounts or audits.
By narrowing recount laws and relying on more precise safeguards, states can cut costs, deliver final results more swiftly, and reinforce public confidence in elections.
America has a recount problem. State recount laws too often invite costly, unnecessary delays that undermine confidence in elections without changing outcomes. Losing candidates prolong the contest and sell false hope in fundraising pleas. States should amend their laws to significantly narrow the circumstances in which recounts take place.
A recount is a blunt instrument. It requires all ballots in a state or a district to be re-examined, a time-consuming process. A statewide recount can cost the state millions of dollars at a time when election officials are already exhausted from having run an election. And in the contemporary era, the canvass of votes is highly accurate. Optical scan machines are extremely accurate at tabulating votes on hand-marked ballots.
Recounts rarely change the outcome of an election, and it only happens in the closest of contests. In a recount, errors tend to be equitably distributed between candidates. That means both candidates tend to gain or lose votes during the recount. Only if the losing candidate can systematically gain votes can the losing candidate win. And those circumstances are rare.
The result didn’t change when Bob Casey dragged out his loss in the Pennsylvania election in 2024 after he lost by 0.22 percentage points. Nor when Donald Trump sought a recount in 2020 after losing the presidential election in Georgia by a similar margin. In fact, it’s almost impossible to find a recount change a result—and when it does, it’s because the margin is less than 0.1%.
If recounts are unlikely to change outcomes, states should focus on better ways that election systems can ensure accuracy.
One such mechanism is the administrative recount. When an election official detects a problem in a specific location, she can order a hand count in that precinct or county. Michigan employed this device in 2020, when the unofficial results in Antrim County revealed an error in the tabulation machine programming. After the error was corrected, a hand count confirmed the results. But the entire state avoided a burdensome recount because of the mistakes in one specific county. And the results can be amended if the administrative recount identifies a mistake.
Another is the audit. Some states randomly choose a handful of precincts to perform a hand tally and ensure that the results match the machine tally. Others use a more sophisticated device, the risk-limiting audit. That audit uses a statistical analysis to determine the number of ballots to check to ensure the apparent winner is the actual winner. The narrower the election, the more ballots are inspected to identify if there are discrepancies that might change the results.
States often have election contest statutes, where a candidate can formally contest the results in court if there was systematic fraud or suppression. This legal mechanism to challenge the results of an election can also occur regardless of a recount.
States should lean on these other devices to ensure the results of an election are accurate, and they should look to reform their recount laws.
First, a recount should only be triggered if the margin of victory is 0.1% of the total votes cast or 10 votes, whichever is larger, or in the event of a tie. This limit ensures that only recounts with a realistic chance of altering the outcome can occur. States like Pennsylvania have a limit five times higher, which sweeps in far more elections—and situations in which the recount is pointless.
Second, recounts should be automatic. Candidates sometimes get blamed for being sore losers when they request recounts. But if the margin is close enough to merit a recount, the law should simply require a recount.
Third, a recount should use the same method as the original count. If ballots are counted by a machine, they should be recounted by a machine. Hand counts are less accurate, more costly, and time consuming. Hand counts instead should be limited to administrative recounts or audits.
By narrowing recount laws and relying on more precise safeguards, states can cut costs, deliver final results more swiftly, and reinforce public confidence in elections.
America has a recount problem. State recount laws too often invite costly, unnecessary delays that undermine confidence in elections without changing outcomes. Losing candidates prolong the contest and sell false hope in fundraising pleas. States should amend their laws to significantly narrow the circumstances in which recounts take place.
A recount is a blunt instrument. It requires all ballots in a state or a district to be re-examined, a time-consuming process. A statewide recount can cost the state millions of dollars at a time when election officials are already exhausted from having run an election. And in the contemporary era, the canvass of votes is highly accurate. Optical scan machines are extremely accurate at tabulating votes on hand-marked ballots.
Recounts rarely change the outcome of an election, and it only happens in the closest of contests. In a recount, errors tend to be equitably distributed between candidates. That means both candidates tend to gain or lose votes during the recount. Only if the losing candidate can systematically gain votes can the losing candidate win. And those circumstances are rare.
The result didn’t change when Bob Casey dragged out his loss in the Pennsylvania election in 2024 after he lost by 0.22 percentage points. Nor when Donald Trump sought a recount in 2020 after losing the presidential election in Georgia by a similar margin. In fact, it’s almost impossible to find a recount change a result—and when it does, it’s because the margin is less than 0.1%.
If recounts are unlikely to change outcomes, states should focus on better ways that election systems can ensure accuracy.
One such mechanism is the administrative recount. When an election official detects a problem in a specific location, she can order a hand count in that precinct or county. Michigan employed this device in 2020, when the unofficial results in Antrim County revealed an error in the tabulation machine programming. After the error was corrected, a hand count confirmed the results. But the entire state avoided a burdensome recount because of the mistakes in one specific county. And the results can be amended if the administrative recount identifies a mistake.
Another is the audit. Some states randomly choose a handful of precincts to perform a hand tally and ensure that the results match the machine tally. Others use a more sophisticated device, the risk-limiting audit. That audit uses a statistical analysis to determine the number of ballots to check to ensure the apparent winner is the actual winner. The narrower the election, the more ballots are inspected to identify if there are discrepancies that might change the results.
States often have election contest statutes, where a candidate can formally contest the results in court if there was systematic fraud or suppression. This legal mechanism to challenge the results of an election can also occur regardless of a recount.
States should lean on these other devices to ensure the results of an election are accurate, and they should look to reform their recount laws.
First, a recount should only be triggered if the margin of victory is 0.1% of the total votes cast or 10 votes, whichever is larger, or in the event of a tie. This limit ensures that only recounts with a realistic chance of altering the outcome can occur. States like Pennsylvania have a limit five times higher, which sweeps in far more elections—and situations in which the recount is pointless.
Second, recounts should be automatic. Candidates sometimes get blamed for being sore losers when they request recounts. But if the margin is close enough to merit a recount, the law should simply require a recount.
Third, a recount should use the same method as the original count. If ballots are counted by a machine, they should be recounted by a machine. Hand counts are less accurate, more costly, and time consuming. Hand counts instead should be limited to administrative recounts or audits.
By narrowing recount laws and relying on more precise safeguards, states can cut costs, deliver final results more swiftly, and reinforce public confidence in elections.
America has a recount problem. State recount laws too often invite costly, unnecessary delays that undermine confidence in elections without changing outcomes. Losing candidates prolong the contest and sell false hope in fundraising pleas. States should amend their laws to significantly narrow the circumstances in which recounts take place.
A recount is a blunt instrument. It requires all ballots in a state or a district to be re-examined, a time-consuming process. A statewide recount can cost the state millions of dollars at a time when election officials are already exhausted from having run an election. And in the contemporary era, the canvass of votes is highly accurate. Optical scan machines are extremely accurate at tabulating votes on hand-marked ballots.
Recounts rarely change the outcome of an election, and it only happens in the closest of contests. In a recount, errors tend to be equitably distributed between candidates. That means both candidates tend to gain or lose votes during the recount. Only if the losing candidate can systematically gain votes can the losing candidate win. And those circumstances are rare.
The result didn’t change when Bob Casey dragged out his loss in the Pennsylvania election in 2024 after he lost by 0.22 percentage points. Nor when Donald Trump sought a recount in 2020 after losing the presidential election in Georgia by a similar margin. In fact, it’s almost impossible to find a recount change a result—and when it does, it’s because the margin is less than 0.1%.
If recounts are unlikely to change outcomes, states should focus on better ways that election systems can ensure accuracy.
One such mechanism is the administrative recount. When an election official detects a problem in a specific location, she can order a hand count in that precinct or county. Michigan employed this device in 2020, when the unofficial results in Antrim County revealed an error in the tabulation machine programming. After the error was corrected, a hand count confirmed the results. But the entire state avoided a burdensome recount because of the mistakes in one specific county. And the results can be amended if the administrative recount identifies a mistake.
Another is the audit. Some states randomly choose a handful of precincts to perform a hand tally and ensure that the results match the machine tally. Others use a more sophisticated device, the risk-limiting audit. That audit uses a statistical analysis to determine the number of ballots to check to ensure the apparent winner is the actual winner. The narrower the election, the more ballots are inspected to identify if there are discrepancies that might change the results.
States often have election contest statutes, where a candidate can formally contest the results in court if there was systematic fraud or suppression. This legal mechanism to challenge the results of an election can also occur regardless of a recount.
States should lean on these other devices to ensure the results of an election are accurate, and they should look to reform their recount laws.
First, a recount should only be triggered if the margin of victory is 0.1% of the total votes cast or 10 votes, whichever is larger, or in the event of a tie. This limit ensures that only recounts with a realistic chance of altering the outcome can occur. States like Pennsylvania have a limit five times higher, which sweeps in far more elections—and situations in which the recount is pointless.
Second, recounts should be automatic. Candidates sometimes get blamed for being sore losers when they request recounts. But if the margin is close enough to merit a recount, the law should simply require a recount.
Third, a recount should use the same method as the original count. If ballots are counted by a machine, they should be recounted by a machine. Hand counts are less accurate, more costly, and time consuming. Hand counts instead should be limited to administrative recounts or audits.
By narrowing recount laws and relying on more precise safeguards, states can cut costs, deliver final results more swiftly, and reinforce public confidence in elections.
America has a recount problem. State recount laws too often invite costly, unnecessary delays that undermine confidence in elections without changing outcomes. Losing candidates prolong the contest and sell false hope in fundraising pleas. States should amend their laws to significantly narrow the circumstances in which recounts take place.
A recount is a blunt instrument. It requires all ballots in a state or a district to be re-examined, a time-consuming process. A statewide recount can cost the state millions of dollars at a time when election officials are already exhausted from having run an election. And in the contemporary era, the canvass of votes is highly accurate. Optical scan machines are extremely accurate at tabulating votes on hand-marked ballots.
Recounts rarely change the outcome of an election, and it only happens in the closest of contests. In a recount, errors tend to be equitably distributed between candidates. That means both candidates tend to gain or lose votes during the recount. Only if the losing candidate can systematically gain votes can the losing candidate win. And those circumstances are rare.
The result didn’t change when Bob Casey dragged out his loss in the Pennsylvania election in 2024 after he lost by 0.22 percentage points. Nor when Donald Trump sought a recount in 2020 after losing the presidential election in Georgia by a similar margin. In fact, it’s almost impossible to find a recount change a result—and when it does, it’s because the margin is less than 0.1%.
If recounts are unlikely to change outcomes, states should focus on better ways that election systems can ensure accuracy.
One such mechanism is the administrative recount. When an election official detects a problem in a specific location, she can order a hand count in that precinct or county. Michigan employed this device in 2020, when the unofficial results in Antrim County revealed an error in the tabulation machine programming. After the error was corrected, a hand count confirmed the results. But the entire state avoided a burdensome recount because of the mistakes in one specific county. And the results can be amended if the administrative recount identifies a mistake.
Another is the audit. Some states randomly choose a handful of precincts to perform a hand tally and ensure that the results match the machine tally. Others use a more sophisticated device, the risk-limiting audit. That audit uses a statistical analysis to determine the number of ballots to check to ensure the apparent winner is the actual winner. The narrower the election, the more ballots are inspected to identify if there are discrepancies that might change the results.
States often have election contest statutes, where a candidate can formally contest the results in court if there was systematic fraud or suppression. This legal mechanism to challenge the results of an election can also occur regardless of a recount.
States should lean on these other devices to ensure the results of an election are accurate, and they should look to reform their recount laws.
First, a recount should only be triggered if the margin of victory is 0.1% of the total votes cast or 10 votes, whichever is larger, or in the event of a tie. This limit ensures that only recounts with a realistic chance of altering the outcome can occur. States like Pennsylvania have a limit five times higher, which sweeps in far more elections—and situations in which the recount is pointless.
Second, recounts should be automatic. Candidates sometimes get blamed for being sore losers when they request recounts. But if the margin is close enough to merit a recount, the law should simply require a recount.
Third, a recount should use the same method as the original count. If ballots are counted by a machine, they should be recounted by a machine. Hand counts are less accurate, more costly, and time consuming. Hand counts instead should be limited to administrative recounts or audits.
By narrowing recount laws and relying on more precise safeguards, states can cut costs, deliver final results more swiftly, and reinforce public confidence in elections.
America has a recount problem. State recount laws too often invite costly, unnecessary delays that undermine confidence in elections without changing outcomes. Losing candidates prolong the contest and sell false hope in fundraising pleas. States should amend their laws to significantly narrow the circumstances in which recounts take place.
A recount is a blunt instrument. It requires all ballots in a state or a district to be re-examined, a time-consuming process. A statewide recount can cost the state millions of dollars at a time when election officials are already exhausted from having run an election. And in the contemporary era, the canvass of votes is highly accurate. Optical scan machines are extremely accurate at tabulating votes on hand-marked ballots.
Recounts rarely change the outcome of an election, and it only happens in the closest of contests. In a recount, errors tend to be equitably distributed between candidates. That means both candidates tend to gain or lose votes during the recount. Only if the losing candidate can systematically gain votes can the losing candidate win. And those circumstances are rare.
The result didn’t change when Bob Casey dragged out his loss in the Pennsylvania election in 2024 after he lost by 0.22 percentage points. Nor when Donald Trump sought a recount in 2020 after losing the presidential election in Georgia by a similar margin. In fact, it’s almost impossible to find a recount change a result—and when it does, it’s because the margin is less than 0.1%.
If recounts are unlikely to change outcomes, states should focus on better ways that election systems can ensure accuracy.
One such mechanism is the administrative recount. When an election official detects a problem in a specific location, she can order a hand count in that precinct or county. Michigan employed this device in 2020, when the unofficial results in Antrim County revealed an error in the tabulation machine programming. After the error was corrected, a hand count confirmed the results. But the entire state avoided a burdensome recount because of the mistakes in one specific county. And the results can be amended if the administrative recount identifies a mistake.
Another is the audit. Some states randomly choose a handful of precincts to perform a hand tally and ensure that the results match the machine tally. Others use a more sophisticated device, the risk-limiting audit. That audit uses a statistical analysis to determine the number of ballots to check to ensure the apparent winner is the actual winner. The narrower the election, the more ballots are inspected to identify if there are discrepancies that might change the results.
States often have election contest statutes, where a candidate can formally contest the results in court if there was systematic fraud or suppression. This legal mechanism to challenge the results of an election can also occur regardless of a recount.
States should lean on these other devices to ensure the results of an election are accurate, and they should look to reform their recount laws.
First, a recount should only be triggered if the margin of victory is 0.1% of the total votes cast or 10 votes, whichever is larger, or in the event of a tie. This limit ensures that only recounts with a realistic chance of altering the outcome can occur. States like Pennsylvania have a limit five times higher, which sweeps in far more elections—and situations in which the recount is pointless.
Second, recounts should be automatic. Candidates sometimes get blamed for being sore losers when they request recounts. But if the margin is close enough to merit a recount, the law should simply require a recount.
Third, a recount should use the same method as the original count. If ballots are counted by a machine, they should be recounted by a machine. Hand counts are less accurate, more costly, and time consuming. Hand counts instead should be limited to administrative recounts or audits.
By narrowing recount laws and relying on more precise safeguards, states can cut costs, deliver final results more swiftly, and reinforce public confidence in elections.
About the Author
Derek Muller
Muller is a Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School and a nationally-recognized scholar in the field of election law. His research focuses on the role of states in the administration of federal elections, the constitutional contours of voting rights and election administration, the limits of judicial power in the domain of elections, and the Electoral College. He is the Co-Reporter on a new Restatement of the Law, Election Litigation, a project of the American Law Institute.
About the Author
Derek Muller
Muller is a Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School and a nationally-recognized scholar in the field of election law. His research focuses on the role of states in the administration of federal elections, the constitutional contours of voting rights and election administration, the limits of judicial power in the domain of elections, and the Electoral College. He is the Co-Reporter on a new Restatement of the Law, Election Litigation, a project of the American Law Institute.
About the Author
Derek Muller
Muller is a Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School and a nationally-recognized scholar in the field of election law. His research focuses on the role of states in the administration of federal elections, the constitutional contours of voting rights and election administration, the limits of judicial power in the domain of elections, and the Electoral College. He is the Co-Reporter on a new Restatement of the Law, Election Litigation, a project of the American Law Institute.
About the Author
Derek Muller
Muller is a Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School and a nationally-recognized scholar in the field of election law. His research focuses on the role of states in the administration of federal elections, the constitutional contours of voting rights and election administration, the limits of judicial power in the domain of elections, and the Electoral College. He is the Co-Reporter on a new Restatement of the Law, Election Litigation, a project of the American Law Institute.
About the Author
Derek Muller
Muller is a Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School and a nationally-recognized scholar in the field of election law. His research focuses on the role of states in the administration of federal elections, the constitutional contours of voting rights and election administration, the limits of judicial power in the domain of elections, and the Electoral College. He is the Co-Reporter on a new Restatement of the Law, Election Litigation, a project of the American Law Institute.
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