Editor’s Note: This piece is the first in the Democracy Project’s "What's Next?" series, which analyzes democratic reforms.

The phrase “the power of the purse” is an odd metaphor for what is in fact one of the most consequential authorities vested in the United States Congress. Its gendered connotations are particularly striking given that, for most of American history, control of federal spending rested exclusively with men. The Senate Appropriations Committee, established in 1867, did not elect its first woman chair until Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) in 2012. The House Appropriations Committee, operating since 1865, did not have a woman chair until 2019, when Representative Nita M. Lowey (D-NY), who also happened to be my boss, assumed the role.

Federal spending—and the authority to direct it—has long served as one of Congress’s most powerful constitutional tools. Presidents have contested, negotiated, and at times attempted to circumvent congressional control over spending since the earliest years of the Republic. A prominent example is the Louisiana Purchase: President Thomas Jefferson secured a $15 million loan from foreign governments to acquire the territory from Napoleon, only for Congress to approve the purchase five months after the fact. Despite such episodes, the prevailing constitutional understanding for most of American history has been that spending falls squarely within Congress’s domain, as articulated explicitly in both the Spending Clause and the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution.

President Richard Nixon is often invoked as a modern case of executive overreach in the area of federal spending. His efforts to centralize budgetary authority were confronted by a Congress still protective of its status as a coequal branch of government and its own institutional prerogatives, prompting legislative responses designed to constrain presidential impoundment and reaffirm Congress’s control. By contrast, today’s Congress has largely acquiesced to a President who asserts broad authority over spending decisions. Although many Members of the President’s party—particularly those serving on the Appropriations Committees—may privately show their annoyance, political incentives increasingly favor loyalty to political party rather than to Congress as an institution.

The constitutional authority over appropriations may be the last vestige of power that historically ensured Congress’s status as a coequal branch of government. Congress has already relinquished significant elements of its authorizing responsibilities. Perhaps most prominently, Congress has repeatedly ceded its war-making authority by allowing the Executive Branch to rely on outdated Authorizations for Use of Military Force. Trade policy has similarly shifted toward presidential dominance through unilateral tariff actions. More recently, the Senate has undermined its own advice-and-consent function by normalizing the bundling of nominations under increasing pressure from the White House. This erosion of congressional authority did not originate with the Trump administration, but the current presidency has accelerated these trends.

This matters only if one believes a functional Congress is essential to our American democracy. When the Executive Branch or Judiciary encounters systemic crises, scholars and the media call for reform. In contrast, congressional dysfunction is shrugged off as a norm while congressional leadership uses workarounds, such as using the House Rules Committee to quell bipartisan legislation that does not align with the President.  These tactics allow the institution to continue to limp along, deepening the dysfunction most Americans now expect.  If the goal is institutional restoration, reclaiming Congress’s spending authority is a logical starting point. Although the recent 43-day government shutdown might suggest that appropriations are an especially difficult area in which to rebuild institutional capacity, the opposite may be true. Because federal spending directly affects constituents, it offers one of the clearest opportunities for legislators to find common ground and demonstrate responsiveness to the needs of their districts.  As we think through solutions, we also must refrain from making matters worse.  More cameras in congressional hearing rooms have resulted in mostly theatrics rather than substance.  Good intentions, awful outcomes.  Professor Jonathan Gould’s piece for this series effectively highlights this risk.

Congress deploys its spending power not only through the appropriations process but also through the budget reconciliation process—administered by the Budget Committees. The latter has become increasingly dominant because it permits passage by simple majorities in both chambers. Four of the most significant reconciliation bills of recent decades—the Inflation Reduction Act, the American Rescue Plan, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, and “The One Big Beautiful Bill”—were presidential priorities advanced by partisan majorities.

By contrast, rank-and-file Members typically secure priorities important to their districts through the regular appropriations bills. These bills include nationally significant programs, but when the process functions as intended, they also allow Members to make meaningful contributions that reflect the needs of their communities. There is also a soft power exerted through the appropriations process, sometimes in statute and often not.  When Congress was truly in charge of spending priorities, a phone call was all that was needed to educate a Cabinet Secretary on congressional intent before they made a decision contrary to the spirit of the law. Broadening participation in government decision-making—especially by elected representatives—is, on balance, a democratic strength rather than a weakness.

The breakdown of the appropriations process reflects broader institutional atrophy, not unlike the decline of the authorization process before it, with the annual bill to authorize the Department of Defense standing as the noteworthy exception. Although the causes of congressional dysfunction extend beyond the scope of this essay, they are intertwined with well-documented factors such as media consolidation, campaign finance dynamics, partisan gerrymandering, and political polarization. These issues must be addressed, but reforms targeted specifically at restoring congressional capacity remain essential.

One potential reform is to expand the size and representation of Congress’s spending committees. These committees oversee virtually every area of federal policy, yet only 62 of the 435 House Members serve on the Appropriations Committee. The Senate Appropriations Committee includes only 29 of 100 Senators. The committees that oversee our largest entitlement programs are even smaller.  Senate Finance has 27 members, House Ways and Means has 43 members, and House Energy and Commerce has 52 members. Increasing buy in at the front end of a process could lead to more ownership and better outcomes in the final product.

In addition to reconsidering membership structure, congressional staff require significant expansion. Effective oversight depends on the willingness and ability of the Executive Branch to cooperate—not only in producing documents or complying with subpoenas, but also in implementing appropriations in ways consistent with congressional intent. As executive cooperation has declined, Congress has lacked the staff capacity and resources to counterbalance this shift.

Congress need not match the Executive Branch’s two million civilian employees, but it requires more than its current 10,000 staff. Some capacity exists within its ancillary institutions—such as the Government Accountability Office (approximately 3,000 staff), the Congressional Budget Office (275 staff), and the Library of Congress’ Congressional Research Service (approximately 600 staff). Yet these institutions have increasingly come under political attack by Members willing to undermine Congress’s own infrastructure in defense of the President. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees together employ approximately 230 staff who must oversee and fund nearly every federal agency. By contrast, the Office of the Comptroller at the Department of Defense alone has close to the same amount, and each military service, command, and installation employs thousands more in budgeting and procurement. Congress is, by any measure, dramatically outmatched.

A final recommendation—one I recognize will not be popular given Congress’s approval ratings—is to begin a dialogue about the length of House terms.  The average House race now costs more than $2 million, and with fundraising demands at that scale, it is not surprising that many Members have limited time for the work of legislating. Their rhythm has become a constant cycle of “fundraise and run,” leaving little room for policy development, oversight, or institutional stewardship.  One option that has been at the forefront of debate is to overturn the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision.  The financial incentives that now structure congressional races seem to have made that an elusive goal, so I offer another option worth debating.  Extending House terms to four years would not solve all of Congress’s dysfunction, but it would give Members more space to govern rather than campaign, and it may help restore some of the deliberative capacity the institution has steadily lost.

A reinvigorated Congress—capable of exercising its constitutional powers, reclaiming its authority over spending, and performing sustained oversight—remains essential to the functioning of American democracy. The path to restoring legislative capacity begins with recognizing the structural imbalance that has emerged and taking deliberate steps to rebuild the institution intended to be the first branch of government.