Oct 23, 2025
Help Legislators Legislate Again
Jonathan H. Adler
Oct 23, 2025
Help Legislators Legislate Again
Jonathan H. Adler
Oct 23, 2025
Help Legislators Legislate Again
Jonathan H. Adler
Oct 23, 2025
Help Legislators Legislate Again
Jonathan H. Adler
Oct 23, 2025
Help Legislators Legislate Again
Jonathan H. Adler
Oct 23, 2025
Help Legislators Legislate Again
Jonathan H. Adler
Congress is failing at its most basic constitutional function: legislating. While our representatives usually manage to pass appropriations bills and avoid extended government shutdowns, the regular process of lawmaking has largely ground to a halt. This breakdown isn't just about passing fewer bills;it represents a fundamental erosion of Congress's ability to govern. Congress used to revisit and reauthorize foundational statutes on a regular basis. No longer. Old, obsolete laws remain on the books and new laws to address new or emerging problems rarely get enacted. The resulting policy-making vacuum encourages executive overreach and fosters litigation, as federal agencies try to apply outdated statutes to contemporary problems.
Congress is supposed to be a deliberative body in which representatives negotiate, compromise, and build consensus on the nation's most pressing challenges. True legislating requires assembling coalitions to build a majority and overcome procedural hurdles. This, in turn, requires mastering complex policy questions and developing relationships and trust across the aisle. Successful legislating requires recognizing that people of good faith can disagree and accepting that successful legislation rarely pleases everyone completely.
Many factors contribute to this legislative paralysis. Structural rules like the Senate filibuster often get blamed, but these same procedures didn't prevent meaningful legislative action in previous decades. The root causes of persistent obstruction and legislative inertia lie elsewhere. Some contributors are apparent, such as the increase in political tribalism. Others, less so, such as campaign finance rules.
Federal campaign finance laws adopted in the late 20th century have done little to keep money out of politics, but they have had unintended consequences on how Congress functions.
Federal campaign finance laws require legislators to fill their war chests primarily through small donations. With individual contribution limits capped at $3,300 per candidate per election, representatives must reach exponentially more donors to raise equivalent funds. It is common for members of Congress to spend two to four hours per day soliciting donations—time that could otherwise be devoted to meeting with constituents or colleagues, developing policy expertise, or working on legislation.
Former Senator Alan Simpson captured this problem perfectly: "When we were spending so much time raising money, we simply could not devote quality time to thoughtful decisions and debate. It lowered the substance of our work."
Effective legislating depends on relationships. Developing the trust and understanding necessary for successful compromise requires face-to-face interaction and sustained engagement. Yet when members aren't casting votes or delivering speeches, they're increasingly found at phone banks or pursuing media hits, rather than in colleagues' offices working through disagreements.
The structure of small-dollar fundraising creates incentives that undermine effective governing. Smaller donors are often more tribal and ideological, and respond more readily to rage-bait and political posturing than to the quiet work of legislating. They're more likely to contribute after seeing a viral social media clip or inflammatory TV interview than after learning about behind-the-scenes coalition-building.
This dynamic rewards exactly the wrong behavior. What gets a member on television or makes a clip go viral is divisive rhetoric and gotcha moments—not sitting down with someone across the aisle to find common ground. Members who depend on passionate small-dollar donors from highly partisan bases risk alienating their funding sources by engaging in bipartisan compromise.
The nationalization of fundraising through online platforms has accelerated this trend. Representatives can now raise significant money by taking controversial positions that energize donors across the country, rather than focusing on local constituency needs or pragmatic problem-solving. The incentive structure pushes toward performance politics rather than governance. It has also side-lined the parties as moderating institutions.
The irony is stark: campaign finance rules designed to democratize political fundraising and reduce the influence of special interests have inadvertently made legislating more difficult. However well-intentioned, limits on individual contributions and party support have undermined the activities necessary for effective governance — relationship-building, compromise, and nuanced policy development.
Loosening existing contribution limits would not be a silver bullet. There are other factors that fuel performative politics and tribal division. But making it easier for legislators to do their actual jobs is necessary if legislators are to legislate again.
Restoring Congress's capacity to govern will require more than procedural reforms. It demands a hard look at how existing laws, including campaign finance limits, shape legislative behavior and undermine our capacity for legislative governance.
Congress is failing at its most basic constitutional function: legislating. While our representatives usually manage to pass appropriations bills and avoid extended government shutdowns, the regular process of lawmaking has largely ground to a halt. This breakdown isn't just about passing fewer bills;it represents a fundamental erosion of Congress's ability to govern. Congress used to revisit and reauthorize foundational statutes on a regular basis. No longer. Old, obsolete laws remain on the books and new laws to address new or emerging problems rarely get enacted. The resulting policy-making vacuum encourages executive overreach and fosters litigation, as federal agencies try to apply outdated statutes to contemporary problems.
Congress is supposed to be a deliberative body in which representatives negotiate, compromise, and build consensus on the nation's most pressing challenges. True legislating requires assembling coalitions to build a majority and overcome procedural hurdles. This, in turn, requires mastering complex policy questions and developing relationships and trust across the aisle. Successful legislating requires recognizing that people of good faith can disagree and accepting that successful legislation rarely pleases everyone completely.
Many factors contribute to this legislative paralysis. Structural rules like the Senate filibuster often get blamed, but these same procedures didn't prevent meaningful legislative action in previous decades. The root causes of persistent obstruction and legislative inertia lie elsewhere. Some contributors are apparent, such as the increase in political tribalism. Others, less so, such as campaign finance rules.
Federal campaign finance laws adopted in the late 20th century have done little to keep money out of politics, but they have had unintended consequences on how Congress functions.
Federal campaign finance laws require legislators to fill their war chests primarily through small donations. With individual contribution limits capped at $3,300 per candidate per election, representatives must reach exponentially more donors to raise equivalent funds. It is common for members of Congress to spend two to four hours per day soliciting donations—time that could otherwise be devoted to meeting with constituents or colleagues, developing policy expertise, or working on legislation.
Former Senator Alan Simpson captured this problem perfectly: "When we were spending so much time raising money, we simply could not devote quality time to thoughtful decisions and debate. It lowered the substance of our work."
Effective legislating depends on relationships. Developing the trust and understanding necessary for successful compromise requires face-to-face interaction and sustained engagement. Yet when members aren't casting votes or delivering speeches, they're increasingly found at phone banks or pursuing media hits, rather than in colleagues' offices working through disagreements.
The structure of small-dollar fundraising creates incentives that undermine effective governing. Smaller donors are often more tribal and ideological, and respond more readily to rage-bait and political posturing than to the quiet work of legislating. They're more likely to contribute after seeing a viral social media clip or inflammatory TV interview than after learning about behind-the-scenes coalition-building.
This dynamic rewards exactly the wrong behavior. What gets a member on television or makes a clip go viral is divisive rhetoric and gotcha moments—not sitting down with someone across the aisle to find common ground. Members who depend on passionate small-dollar donors from highly partisan bases risk alienating their funding sources by engaging in bipartisan compromise.
The nationalization of fundraising through online platforms has accelerated this trend. Representatives can now raise significant money by taking controversial positions that energize donors across the country, rather than focusing on local constituency needs or pragmatic problem-solving. The incentive structure pushes toward performance politics rather than governance. It has also side-lined the parties as moderating institutions.
The irony is stark: campaign finance rules designed to democratize political fundraising and reduce the influence of special interests have inadvertently made legislating more difficult. However well-intentioned, limits on individual contributions and party support have undermined the activities necessary for effective governance — relationship-building, compromise, and nuanced policy development.
Loosening existing contribution limits would not be a silver bullet. There are other factors that fuel performative politics and tribal division. But making it easier for legislators to do their actual jobs is necessary if legislators are to legislate again.
Restoring Congress's capacity to govern will require more than procedural reforms. It demands a hard look at how existing laws, including campaign finance limits, shape legislative behavior and undermine our capacity for legislative governance.
Congress is failing at its most basic constitutional function: legislating. While our representatives usually manage to pass appropriations bills and avoid extended government shutdowns, the regular process of lawmaking has largely ground to a halt. This breakdown isn't just about passing fewer bills;it represents a fundamental erosion of Congress's ability to govern. Congress used to revisit and reauthorize foundational statutes on a regular basis. No longer. Old, obsolete laws remain on the books and new laws to address new or emerging problems rarely get enacted. The resulting policy-making vacuum encourages executive overreach and fosters litigation, as federal agencies try to apply outdated statutes to contemporary problems.
Congress is supposed to be a deliberative body in which representatives negotiate, compromise, and build consensus on the nation's most pressing challenges. True legislating requires assembling coalitions to build a majority and overcome procedural hurdles. This, in turn, requires mastering complex policy questions and developing relationships and trust across the aisle. Successful legislating requires recognizing that people of good faith can disagree and accepting that successful legislation rarely pleases everyone completely.
Many factors contribute to this legislative paralysis. Structural rules like the Senate filibuster often get blamed, but these same procedures didn't prevent meaningful legislative action in previous decades. The root causes of persistent obstruction and legislative inertia lie elsewhere. Some contributors are apparent, such as the increase in political tribalism. Others, less so, such as campaign finance rules.
Federal campaign finance laws adopted in the late 20th century have done little to keep money out of politics, but they have had unintended consequences on how Congress functions.
Federal campaign finance laws require legislators to fill their war chests primarily through small donations. With individual contribution limits capped at $3,300 per candidate per election, representatives must reach exponentially more donors to raise equivalent funds. It is common for members of Congress to spend two to four hours per day soliciting donations—time that could otherwise be devoted to meeting with constituents or colleagues, developing policy expertise, or working on legislation.
Former Senator Alan Simpson captured this problem perfectly: "When we were spending so much time raising money, we simply could not devote quality time to thoughtful decisions and debate. It lowered the substance of our work."
Effective legislating depends on relationships. Developing the trust and understanding necessary for successful compromise requires face-to-face interaction and sustained engagement. Yet when members aren't casting votes or delivering speeches, they're increasingly found at phone banks or pursuing media hits, rather than in colleagues' offices working through disagreements.
The structure of small-dollar fundraising creates incentives that undermine effective governing. Smaller donors are often more tribal and ideological, and respond more readily to rage-bait and political posturing than to the quiet work of legislating. They're more likely to contribute after seeing a viral social media clip or inflammatory TV interview than after learning about behind-the-scenes coalition-building.
This dynamic rewards exactly the wrong behavior. What gets a member on television or makes a clip go viral is divisive rhetoric and gotcha moments—not sitting down with someone across the aisle to find common ground. Members who depend on passionate small-dollar donors from highly partisan bases risk alienating their funding sources by engaging in bipartisan compromise.
The nationalization of fundraising through online platforms has accelerated this trend. Representatives can now raise significant money by taking controversial positions that energize donors across the country, rather than focusing on local constituency needs or pragmatic problem-solving. The incentive structure pushes toward performance politics rather than governance. It has also side-lined the parties as moderating institutions.
The irony is stark: campaign finance rules designed to democratize political fundraising and reduce the influence of special interests have inadvertently made legislating more difficult. However well-intentioned, limits on individual contributions and party support have undermined the activities necessary for effective governance — relationship-building, compromise, and nuanced policy development.
Loosening existing contribution limits would not be a silver bullet. There are other factors that fuel performative politics and tribal division. But making it easier for legislators to do their actual jobs is necessary if legislators are to legislate again.
Restoring Congress's capacity to govern will require more than procedural reforms. It demands a hard look at how existing laws, including campaign finance limits, shape legislative behavior and undermine our capacity for legislative governance.
Congress is failing at its most basic constitutional function: legislating. While our representatives usually manage to pass appropriations bills and avoid extended government shutdowns, the regular process of lawmaking has largely ground to a halt. This breakdown isn't just about passing fewer bills;it represents a fundamental erosion of Congress's ability to govern. Congress used to revisit and reauthorize foundational statutes on a regular basis. No longer. Old, obsolete laws remain on the books and new laws to address new or emerging problems rarely get enacted. The resulting policy-making vacuum encourages executive overreach and fosters litigation, as federal agencies try to apply outdated statutes to contemporary problems.
Congress is supposed to be a deliberative body in which representatives negotiate, compromise, and build consensus on the nation's most pressing challenges. True legislating requires assembling coalitions to build a majority and overcome procedural hurdles. This, in turn, requires mastering complex policy questions and developing relationships and trust across the aisle. Successful legislating requires recognizing that people of good faith can disagree and accepting that successful legislation rarely pleases everyone completely.
Many factors contribute to this legislative paralysis. Structural rules like the Senate filibuster often get blamed, but these same procedures didn't prevent meaningful legislative action in previous decades. The root causes of persistent obstruction and legislative inertia lie elsewhere. Some contributors are apparent, such as the increase in political tribalism. Others, less so, such as campaign finance rules.
Federal campaign finance laws adopted in the late 20th century have done little to keep money out of politics, but they have had unintended consequences on how Congress functions.
Federal campaign finance laws require legislators to fill their war chests primarily through small donations. With individual contribution limits capped at $3,300 per candidate per election, representatives must reach exponentially more donors to raise equivalent funds. It is common for members of Congress to spend two to four hours per day soliciting donations—time that could otherwise be devoted to meeting with constituents or colleagues, developing policy expertise, or working on legislation.
Former Senator Alan Simpson captured this problem perfectly: "When we were spending so much time raising money, we simply could not devote quality time to thoughtful decisions and debate. It lowered the substance of our work."
Effective legislating depends on relationships. Developing the trust and understanding necessary for successful compromise requires face-to-face interaction and sustained engagement. Yet when members aren't casting votes or delivering speeches, they're increasingly found at phone banks or pursuing media hits, rather than in colleagues' offices working through disagreements.
The structure of small-dollar fundraising creates incentives that undermine effective governing. Smaller donors are often more tribal and ideological, and respond more readily to rage-bait and political posturing than to the quiet work of legislating. They're more likely to contribute after seeing a viral social media clip or inflammatory TV interview than after learning about behind-the-scenes coalition-building.
This dynamic rewards exactly the wrong behavior. What gets a member on television or makes a clip go viral is divisive rhetoric and gotcha moments—not sitting down with someone across the aisle to find common ground. Members who depend on passionate small-dollar donors from highly partisan bases risk alienating their funding sources by engaging in bipartisan compromise.
The nationalization of fundraising through online platforms has accelerated this trend. Representatives can now raise significant money by taking controversial positions that energize donors across the country, rather than focusing on local constituency needs or pragmatic problem-solving. The incentive structure pushes toward performance politics rather than governance. It has also side-lined the parties as moderating institutions.
The irony is stark: campaign finance rules designed to democratize political fundraising and reduce the influence of special interests have inadvertently made legislating more difficult. However well-intentioned, limits on individual contributions and party support have undermined the activities necessary for effective governance — relationship-building, compromise, and nuanced policy development.
Loosening existing contribution limits would not be a silver bullet. There are other factors that fuel performative politics and tribal division. But making it easier for legislators to do their actual jobs is necessary if legislators are to legislate again.
Restoring Congress's capacity to govern will require more than procedural reforms. It demands a hard look at how existing laws, including campaign finance limits, shape legislative behavior and undermine our capacity for legislative governance.
Congress is failing at its most basic constitutional function: legislating. While our representatives usually manage to pass appropriations bills and avoid extended government shutdowns, the regular process of lawmaking has largely ground to a halt. This breakdown isn't just about passing fewer bills;it represents a fundamental erosion of Congress's ability to govern. Congress used to revisit and reauthorize foundational statutes on a regular basis. No longer. Old, obsolete laws remain on the books and new laws to address new or emerging problems rarely get enacted. The resulting policy-making vacuum encourages executive overreach and fosters litigation, as federal agencies try to apply outdated statutes to contemporary problems.
Congress is supposed to be a deliberative body in which representatives negotiate, compromise, and build consensus on the nation's most pressing challenges. True legislating requires assembling coalitions to build a majority and overcome procedural hurdles. This, in turn, requires mastering complex policy questions and developing relationships and trust across the aisle. Successful legislating requires recognizing that people of good faith can disagree and accepting that successful legislation rarely pleases everyone completely.
Many factors contribute to this legislative paralysis. Structural rules like the Senate filibuster often get blamed, but these same procedures didn't prevent meaningful legislative action in previous decades. The root causes of persistent obstruction and legislative inertia lie elsewhere. Some contributors are apparent, such as the increase in political tribalism. Others, less so, such as campaign finance rules.
Federal campaign finance laws adopted in the late 20th century have done little to keep money out of politics, but they have had unintended consequences on how Congress functions.
Federal campaign finance laws require legislators to fill their war chests primarily through small donations. With individual contribution limits capped at $3,300 per candidate per election, representatives must reach exponentially more donors to raise equivalent funds. It is common for members of Congress to spend two to four hours per day soliciting donations—time that could otherwise be devoted to meeting with constituents or colleagues, developing policy expertise, or working on legislation.
Former Senator Alan Simpson captured this problem perfectly: "When we were spending so much time raising money, we simply could not devote quality time to thoughtful decisions and debate. It lowered the substance of our work."
Effective legislating depends on relationships. Developing the trust and understanding necessary for successful compromise requires face-to-face interaction and sustained engagement. Yet when members aren't casting votes or delivering speeches, they're increasingly found at phone banks or pursuing media hits, rather than in colleagues' offices working through disagreements.
The structure of small-dollar fundraising creates incentives that undermine effective governing. Smaller donors are often more tribal and ideological, and respond more readily to rage-bait and political posturing than to the quiet work of legislating. They're more likely to contribute after seeing a viral social media clip or inflammatory TV interview than after learning about behind-the-scenes coalition-building.
This dynamic rewards exactly the wrong behavior. What gets a member on television or makes a clip go viral is divisive rhetoric and gotcha moments—not sitting down with someone across the aisle to find common ground. Members who depend on passionate small-dollar donors from highly partisan bases risk alienating their funding sources by engaging in bipartisan compromise.
The nationalization of fundraising through online platforms has accelerated this trend. Representatives can now raise significant money by taking controversial positions that energize donors across the country, rather than focusing on local constituency needs or pragmatic problem-solving. The incentive structure pushes toward performance politics rather than governance. It has also side-lined the parties as moderating institutions.
The irony is stark: campaign finance rules designed to democratize political fundraising and reduce the influence of special interests have inadvertently made legislating more difficult. However well-intentioned, limits on individual contributions and party support have undermined the activities necessary for effective governance — relationship-building, compromise, and nuanced policy development.
Loosening existing contribution limits would not be a silver bullet. There are other factors that fuel performative politics and tribal division. But making it easier for legislators to do their actual jobs is necessary if legislators are to legislate again.
Restoring Congress's capacity to govern will require more than procedural reforms. It demands a hard look at how existing laws, including campaign finance limits, shape legislative behavior and undermine our capacity for legislative governance.
Congress is failing at its most basic constitutional function: legislating. While our representatives usually manage to pass appropriations bills and avoid extended government shutdowns, the regular process of lawmaking has largely ground to a halt. This breakdown isn't just about passing fewer bills;it represents a fundamental erosion of Congress's ability to govern. Congress used to revisit and reauthorize foundational statutes on a regular basis. No longer. Old, obsolete laws remain on the books and new laws to address new or emerging problems rarely get enacted. The resulting policy-making vacuum encourages executive overreach and fosters litigation, as federal agencies try to apply outdated statutes to contemporary problems.
Congress is supposed to be a deliberative body in which representatives negotiate, compromise, and build consensus on the nation's most pressing challenges. True legislating requires assembling coalitions to build a majority and overcome procedural hurdles. This, in turn, requires mastering complex policy questions and developing relationships and trust across the aisle. Successful legislating requires recognizing that people of good faith can disagree and accepting that successful legislation rarely pleases everyone completely.
Many factors contribute to this legislative paralysis. Structural rules like the Senate filibuster often get blamed, but these same procedures didn't prevent meaningful legislative action in previous decades. The root causes of persistent obstruction and legislative inertia lie elsewhere. Some contributors are apparent, such as the increase in political tribalism. Others, less so, such as campaign finance rules.
Federal campaign finance laws adopted in the late 20th century have done little to keep money out of politics, but they have had unintended consequences on how Congress functions.
Federal campaign finance laws require legislators to fill their war chests primarily through small donations. With individual contribution limits capped at $3,300 per candidate per election, representatives must reach exponentially more donors to raise equivalent funds. It is common for members of Congress to spend two to four hours per day soliciting donations—time that could otherwise be devoted to meeting with constituents or colleagues, developing policy expertise, or working on legislation.
Former Senator Alan Simpson captured this problem perfectly: "When we were spending so much time raising money, we simply could not devote quality time to thoughtful decisions and debate. It lowered the substance of our work."
Effective legislating depends on relationships. Developing the trust and understanding necessary for successful compromise requires face-to-face interaction and sustained engagement. Yet when members aren't casting votes or delivering speeches, they're increasingly found at phone banks or pursuing media hits, rather than in colleagues' offices working through disagreements.
The structure of small-dollar fundraising creates incentives that undermine effective governing. Smaller donors are often more tribal and ideological, and respond more readily to rage-bait and political posturing than to the quiet work of legislating. They're more likely to contribute after seeing a viral social media clip or inflammatory TV interview than after learning about behind-the-scenes coalition-building.
This dynamic rewards exactly the wrong behavior. What gets a member on television or makes a clip go viral is divisive rhetoric and gotcha moments—not sitting down with someone across the aisle to find common ground. Members who depend on passionate small-dollar donors from highly partisan bases risk alienating their funding sources by engaging in bipartisan compromise.
The nationalization of fundraising through online platforms has accelerated this trend. Representatives can now raise significant money by taking controversial positions that energize donors across the country, rather than focusing on local constituency needs or pragmatic problem-solving. The incentive structure pushes toward performance politics rather than governance. It has also side-lined the parties as moderating institutions.
The irony is stark: campaign finance rules designed to democratize political fundraising and reduce the influence of special interests have inadvertently made legislating more difficult. However well-intentioned, limits on individual contributions and party support have undermined the activities necessary for effective governance — relationship-building, compromise, and nuanced policy development.
Loosening existing contribution limits would not be a silver bullet. There are other factors that fuel performative politics and tribal division. But making it easier for legislators to do their actual jobs is necessary if legislators are to legislate again.
Restoring Congress's capacity to govern will require more than procedural reforms. It demands a hard look at how existing laws, including campaign finance limits, shape legislative behavior and undermine our capacity for legislative governance.
About the Author
Jonathan H. Adler
Jonathan H. Adler is the Tazewell Taylor Professor of Law at the William & Mary Law School.
About the Author
Jonathan H. Adler
Jonathan H. Adler is the Tazewell Taylor Professor of Law at the William & Mary Law School.
About the Author
Jonathan H. Adler
Jonathan H. Adler is the Tazewell Taylor Professor of Law at the William & Mary Law School.
About the Author
Jonathan H. Adler
Jonathan H. Adler is the Tazewell Taylor Professor of Law at the William & Mary Law School.
About the Author
Jonathan H. Adler
Jonathan H. Adler is the Tazewell Taylor Professor of Law at the William & Mary Law School.
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