“A people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives” reads an aphorism from James Madison engraved next to an entrance of the Library of Congress. Madison was surely right, even if libraries may not be the first place people turn. Democracy’s primary truth-seeking institutions are the news media, academia, and scientific agencies. When they function well, they empower the people to better understand their needs and interests and to pursue them effectively.
There are signs that these institutions are not functioning well. All are less trusted than previously. Some of this decline stems from the perception that they are politically biased, with mistrust concentrated on the political right. As educational attainment becomes an increasingly good predictor of people’s political preferences—with the highly educated on the left and the less educated on the right—expert opinion both becomes more left-leaning and more mistrusted on the right.
But having just co-authored a book examining the performance of American democracy during the Covid pandemic, the problems with these institutions are not just a matter of perception. They all overplayed their hands during the pandemic. They leveraged their authority and credentials to steer opinion and behavior. In doing so, they exaggerated their knowledge. As former NIH Director Dr. Francis Collins, to his credit, admitted: “We failed to say every time there was a recommendation, guys, this is the best we can do right now. It’s a good chance this is wrong…. We did not admit our ignorance, and that was a profound mistake.”
“We know what works against Covid-19” was a mantra intoned by public health officials throughout the pandemic. The mantra, however, was wishful thinking. In 2020, officials did not know how Covid was transmitted. Airborne transmission would not be widely acknowledged until 2022. Meanwhile, officials mandated policies premised on droplet transmission, such as cloth masks, sanitizing, and social distancing.
Six-foot distancing was a cornerstone of pandemic policy and, according to former FDA commissioner Scott Gottleib, “probably the single most costly intervention the CDC recommended.” It was also the single biggest obstacle to reopening schools. However, it was not based on data. When pressed by congressional investigators for the basis of the six-foot guidance, former NIAID Director Dr. Anthony Fauci said: “I don't recall. It sort of just appeared.”
Other poorly substantiated claims were made regarding the capacity of vaccines to stop Covid transmission. Even though the vaccine trials had not tested for curbing transmission, public health officials assured Americans that getting vaccinated would protect them from giving Covid to others. CDC Director Rochelle Walensky told MSNBC that “vaccinated people do not carry the virus, don’t get sick.” Dr. Fauci stated that vaccinated people become “dead ends” for the virus. Even after the CDC reported on an outbreak where the virus spread quickly among fully vaccinated people, the Biden administration imposed a vaccine mandate based on the mistaken idea.
“A people who mean to be their own governors” need to ask probing questions and seek balance against one-sided expertise. But reporters and scholars tended to cheerlead rather than critically scrutinize policy. In the spring of 2020, when pandemic shutdowns swept the globe, there was little effort to investigate the evidence base for these unprecedented and extraordinarily costly policies. Had researchers looked to the World Health Organization’s systematic review, just published in November 2019, they would have found that the quality of the scientific evidence in favor of almost all non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) had been rated as “low” or “very low.” Among the measures “not recommended in any circumstances” for a respiratory pandemic were contact tracing, quarantine of exposed individuals, and border closure.
Mainstream outlets published narratives about how NPIs had worked in 1918. But the evidence was weak. In 2006, the Institute of Medicine (now the National Academy of Medicine) convened a distinguished committee to examine the evidence from the 1918 pandemic. The committee concluded that “total mortality was only weakly associated” with the NPIs cities employed to slow the spread of the disease. The committee declined to endorse the use of NPIs in future pandemics because “it is almost impossible to say that the interventions, either individually or in combination, will be effective.”
During the pandemic, academic institutions enthusiastically embraced Covid restrictions. Now that the pandemic is over, there have been surprisingly few retrospectives. But for those who do examine the evidence: it is disappointing. States and countries imposing faster, more stringent, or lengthier Covid restrictions did not fare better.
The simple fact is that we did not know what would work to stop Covid-19. Pandemic policy was made amidst great uncertainty. One can only feel empathy for officials tasked with such heavy responsibility. But under such conditions, those whose authority rests on their information and expertise—health advisors, journalists, and academics—are responsible for doing due diligence and being frank about what they do and do not know with confidence. In retrospect, it seems evident that policy was more often made on the basis of hope than solid evidence.
Too many experts want to blame the public’s loss of trust in institutions on polarization and misinformation. But a fair-minded look back at the pandemic reveals that some loss of trust is both understandable and warranted. A lesson for the future is that the experts on whom democracies rely should not exaggerate what they know.
“A people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives” reads an aphorism from James Madison engraved next to an entrance of the Library of Congress. Madison was surely right, even if libraries may not be the first place people turn. Democracy’s primary truth-seeking institutions are the news media, academia, and scientific agencies. When they function well, they empower the people to better understand their needs and interests and to pursue them effectively.
There are signs that these institutions are not functioning well. All are less trusted than previously. Some of this decline stems from the perception that they are politically biased, with mistrust concentrated on the political right. As educational attainment becomes an increasingly good predictor of people’s political preferences—with the highly educated on the left and the less educated on the right—expert opinion both becomes more left-leaning and more mistrusted on the right.
But having just co-authored a book examining the performance of American democracy during the Covid pandemic, the problems with these institutions are not just a matter of perception. They all overplayed their hands during the pandemic. They leveraged their authority and credentials to steer opinion and behavior. In doing so, they exaggerated their knowledge. As former NIH Director Dr. Francis Collins, to his credit, admitted: “We failed to say every time there was a recommendation, guys, this is the best we can do right now. It’s a good chance this is wrong…. We did not admit our ignorance, and that was a profound mistake.”
“We know what works against Covid-19” was a mantra intoned by public health officials throughout the pandemic. The mantra, however, was wishful thinking. In 2020, officials did not know how Covid was transmitted. Airborne transmission would not be widely acknowledged until 2022. Meanwhile, officials mandated policies premised on droplet transmission, such as cloth masks, sanitizing, and social distancing.
Six-foot distancing was a cornerstone of pandemic policy and, according to former FDA commissioner Scott Gottleib, “probably the single most costly intervention the CDC recommended.” It was also the single biggest obstacle to reopening schools. However, it was not based on data. When pressed by congressional investigators for the basis of the six-foot guidance, former NIAID Director Dr. Anthony Fauci said: “I don't recall. It sort of just appeared.”
Other poorly substantiated claims were made regarding the capacity of vaccines to stop Covid transmission. Even though the vaccine trials had not tested for curbing transmission, public health officials assured Americans that getting vaccinated would protect them from giving Covid to others. CDC Director Rochelle Walensky told MSNBC that “vaccinated people do not carry the virus, don’t get sick.” Dr. Fauci stated that vaccinated people become “dead ends” for the virus. Even after the CDC reported on an outbreak where the virus spread quickly among fully vaccinated people, the Biden administration imposed a vaccine mandate based on the mistaken idea.
“A people who mean to be their own governors” need to ask probing questions and seek balance against one-sided expertise. But reporters and scholars tended to cheerlead rather than critically scrutinize policy. In the spring of 2020, when pandemic shutdowns swept the globe, there was little effort to investigate the evidence base for these unprecedented and extraordinarily costly policies. Had researchers looked to the World Health Organization’s systematic review, just published in November 2019, they would have found that the quality of the scientific evidence in favor of almost all non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) had been rated as “low” or “very low.” Among the measures “not recommended in any circumstances” for a respiratory pandemic were contact tracing, quarantine of exposed individuals, and border closure.
Mainstream outlets published narratives about how NPIs had worked in 1918. But the evidence was weak. In 2006, the Institute of Medicine (now the National Academy of Medicine) convened a distinguished committee to examine the evidence from the 1918 pandemic. The committee concluded that “total mortality was only weakly associated” with the NPIs cities employed to slow the spread of the disease. The committee declined to endorse the use of NPIs in future pandemics because “it is almost impossible to say that the interventions, either individually or in combination, will be effective.”
During the pandemic, academic institutions enthusiastically embraced Covid restrictions. Now that the pandemic is over, there have been surprisingly few retrospectives. But for those who do examine the evidence: it is disappointing. States and countries imposing faster, more stringent, or lengthier Covid restrictions did not fare better.
The simple fact is that we did not know what would work to stop Covid-19. Pandemic policy was made amidst great uncertainty. One can only feel empathy for officials tasked with such heavy responsibility. But under such conditions, those whose authority rests on their information and expertise—health advisors, journalists, and academics—are responsible for doing due diligence and being frank about what they do and do not know with confidence. In retrospect, it seems evident that policy was more often made on the basis of hope than solid evidence.
Too many experts want to blame the public’s loss of trust in institutions on polarization and misinformation. But a fair-minded look back at the pandemic reveals that some loss of trust is both understandable and warranted. A lesson for the future is that the experts on whom democracies rely should not exaggerate what they know.
“A people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives” reads an aphorism from James Madison engraved next to an entrance of the Library of Congress. Madison was surely right, even if libraries may not be the first place people turn. Democracy’s primary truth-seeking institutions are the news media, academia, and scientific agencies. When they function well, they empower the people to better understand their needs and interests and to pursue them effectively.
There are signs that these institutions are not functioning well. All are less trusted than previously. Some of this decline stems from the perception that they are politically biased, with mistrust concentrated on the political right. As educational attainment becomes an increasingly good predictor of people’s political preferences—with the highly educated on the left and the less educated on the right—expert opinion both becomes more left-leaning and more mistrusted on the right.
But having just co-authored a book examining the performance of American democracy during the Covid pandemic, the problems with these institutions are not just a matter of perception. They all overplayed their hands during the pandemic. They leveraged their authority and credentials to steer opinion and behavior. In doing so, they exaggerated their knowledge. As former NIH Director Dr. Francis Collins, to his credit, admitted: “We failed to say every time there was a recommendation, guys, this is the best we can do right now. It’s a good chance this is wrong…. We did not admit our ignorance, and that was a profound mistake.”
“We know what works against Covid-19” was a mantra intoned by public health officials throughout the pandemic. The mantra, however, was wishful thinking. In 2020, officials did not know how Covid was transmitted. Airborne transmission would not be widely acknowledged until 2022. Meanwhile, officials mandated policies premised on droplet transmission, such as cloth masks, sanitizing, and social distancing.
Six-foot distancing was a cornerstone of pandemic policy and, according to former FDA commissioner Scott Gottleib, “probably the single most costly intervention the CDC recommended.” It was also the single biggest obstacle to reopening schools. However, it was not based on data. When pressed by congressional investigators for the basis of the six-foot guidance, former NIAID Director Dr. Anthony Fauci said: “I don't recall. It sort of just appeared.”
Other poorly substantiated claims were made regarding the capacity of vaccines to stop Covid transmission. Even though the vaccine trials had not tested for curbing transmission, public health officials assured Americans that getting vaccinated would protect them from giving Covid to others. CDC Director Rochelle Walensky told MSNBC that “vaccinated people do not carry the virus, don’t get sick.” Dr. Fauci stated that vaccinated people become “dead ends” for the virus. Even after the CDC reported on an outbreak where the virus spread quickly among fully vaccinated people, the Biden administration imposed a vaccine mandate based on the mistaken idea.
“A people who mean to be their own governors” need to ask probing questions and seek balance against one-sided expertise. But reporters and scholars tended to cheerlead rather than critically scrutinize policy. In the spring of 2020, when pandemic shutdowns swept the globe, there was little effort to investigate the evidence base for these unprecedented and extraordinarily costly policies. Had researchers looked to the World Health Organization’s systematic review, just published in November 2019, they would have found that the quality of the scientific evidence in favor of almost all non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) had been rated as “low” or “very low.” Among the measures “not recommended in any circumstances” for a respiratory pandemic were contact tracing, quarantine of exposed individuals, and border closure.
Mainstream outlets published narratives about how NPIs had worked in 1918. But the evidence was weak. In 2006, the Institute of Medicine (now the National Academy of Medicine) convened a distinguished committee to examine the evidence from the 1918 pandemic. The committee concluded that “total mortality was only weakly associated” with the NPIs cities employed to slow the spread of the disease. The committee declined to endorse the use of NPIs in future pandemics because “it is almost impossible to say that the interventions, either individually or in combination, will be effective.”
During the pandemic, academic institutions enthusiastically embraced Covid restrictions. Now that the pandemic is over, there have been surprisingly few retrospectives. But for those who do examine the evidence: it is disappointing. States and countries imposing faster, more stringent, or lengthier Covid restrictions did not fare better.
The simple fact is that we did not know what would work to stop Covid-19. Pandemic policy was made amidst great uncertainty. One can only feel empathy for officials tasked with such heavy responsibility. But under such conditions, those whose authority rests on their information and expertise—health advisors, journalists, and academics—are responsible for doing due diligence and being frank about what they do and do not know with confidence. In retrospect, it seems evident that policy was more often made on the basis of hope than solid evidence.
Too many experts want to blame the public’s loss of trust in institutions on polarization and misinformation. But a fair-minded look back at the pandemic reveals that some loss of trust is both understandable and warranted. A lesson for the future is that the experts on whom democracies rely should not exaggerate what they know.
“A people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives” reads an aphorism from James Madison engraved next to an entrance of the Library of Congress. Madison was surely right, even if libraries may not be the first place people turn. Democracy’s primary truth-seeking institutions are the news media, academia, and scientific agencies. When they function well, they empower the people to better understand their needs and interests and to pursue them effectively.
There are signs that these institutions are not functioning well. All are less trusted than previously. Some of this decline stems from the perception that they are politically biased, with mistrust concentrated on the political right. As educational attainment becomes an increasingly good predictor of people’s political preferences—with the highly educated on the left and the less educated on the right—expert opinion both becomes more left-leaning and more mistrusted on the right.
But having just co-authored a book examining the performance of American democracy during the Covid pandemic, the problems with these institutions are not just a matter of perception. They all overplayed their hands during the pandemic. They leveraged their authority and credentials to steer opinion and behavior. In doing so, they exaggerated their knowledge. As former NIH Director Dr. Francis Collins, to his credit, admitted: “We failed to say every time there was a recommendation, guys, this is the best we can do right now. It’s a good chance this is wrong…. We did not admit our ignorance, and that was a profound mistake.”
“We know what works against Covid-19” was a mantra intoned by public health officials throughout the pandemic. The mantra, however, was wishful thinking. In 2020, officials did not know how Covid was transmitted. Airborne transmission would not be widely acknowledged until 2022. Meanwhile, officials mandated policies premised on droplet transmission, such as cloth masks, sanitizing, and social distancing.
Six-foot distancing was a cornerstone of pandemic policy and, according to former FDA commissioner Scott Gottleib, “probably the single most costly intervention the CDC recommended.” It was also the single biggest obstacle to reopening schools. However, it was not based on data. When pressed by congressional investigators for the basis of the six-foot guidance, former NIAID Director Dr. Anthony Fauci said: “I don't recall. It sort of just appeared.”
Other poorly substantiated claims were made regarding the capacity of vaccines to stop Covid transmission. Even though the vaccine trials had not tested for curbing transmission, public health officials assured Americans that getting vaccinated would protect them from giving Covid to others. CDC Director Rochelle Walensky told MSNBC that “vaccinated people do not carry the virus, don’t get sick.” Dr. Fauci stated that vaccinated people become “dead ends” for the virus. Even after the CDC reported on an outbreak where the virus spread quickly among fully vaccinated people, the Biden administration imposed a vaccine mandate based on the mistaken idea.
“A people who mean to be their own governors” need to ask probing questions and seek balance against one-sided expertise. But reporters and scholars tended to cheerlead rather than critically scrutinize policy. In the spring of 2020, when pandemic shutdowns swept the globe, there was little effort to investigate the evidence base for these unprecedented and extraordinarily costly policies. Had researchers looked to the World Health Organization’s systematic review, just published in November 2019, they would have found that the quality of the scientific evidence in favor of almost all non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) had been rated as “low” or “very low.” Among the measures “not recommended in any circumstances” for a respiratory pandemic were contact tracing, quarantine of exposed individuals, and border closure.
Mainstream outlets published narratives about how NPIs had worked in 1918. But the evidence was weak. In 2006, the Institute of Medicine (now the National Academy of Medicine) convened a distinguished committee to examine the evidence from the 1918 pandemic. The committee concluded that “total mortality was only weakly associated” with the NPIs cities employed to slow the spread of the disease. The committee declined to endorse the use of NPIs in future pandemics because “it is almost impossible to say that the interventions, either individually or in combination, will be effective.”
During the pandemic, academic institutions enthusiastically embraced Covid restrictions. Now that the pandemic is over, there have been surprisingly few retrospectives. But for those who do examine the evidence: it is disappointing. States and countries imposing faster, more stringent, or lengthier Covid restrictions did not fare better.
The simple fact is that we did not know what would work to stop Covid-19. Pandemic policy was made amidst great uncertainty. One can only feel empathy for officials tasked with such heavy responsibility. But under such conditions, those whose authority rests on their information and expertise—health advisors, journalists, and academics—are responsible for doing due diligence and being frank about what they do and do not know with confidence. In retrospect, it seems evident that policy was more often made on the basis of hope than solid evidence.
Too many experts want to blame the public’s loss of trust in institutions on polarization and misinformation. But a fair-minded look back at the pandemic reveals that some loss of trust is both understandable and warranted. A lesson for the future is that the experts on whom democracies rely should not exaggerate what they know.
“A people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives” reads an aphorism from James Madison engraved next to an entrance of the Library of Congress. Madison was surely right, even if libraries may not be the first place people turn. Democracy’s primary truth-seeking institutions are the news media, academia, and scientific agencies. When they function well, they empower the people to better understand their needs and interests and to pursue them effectively.
There are signs that these institutions are not functioning well. All are less trusted than previously. Some of this decline stems from the perception that they are politically biased, with mistrust concentrated on the political right. As educational attainment becomes an increasingly good predictor of people’s political preferences—with the highly educated on the left and the less educated on the right—expert opinion both becomes more left-leaning and more mistrusted on the right.
But having just co-authored a book examining the performance of American democracy during the Covid pandemic, the problems with these institutions are not just a matter of perception. They all overplayed their hands during the pandemic. They leveraged their authority and credentials to steer opinion and behavior. In doing so, they exaggerated their knowledge. As former NIH Director Dr. Francis Collins, to his credit, admitted: “We failed to say every time there was a recommendation, guys, this is the best we can do right now. It’s a good chance this is wrong…. We did not admit our ignorance, and that was a profound mistake.”
“We know what works against Covid-19” was a mantra intoned by public health officials throughout the pandemic. The mantra, however, was wishful thinking. In 2020, officials did not know how Covid was transmitted. Airborne transmission would not be widely acknowledged until 2022. Meanwhile, officials mandated policies premised on droplet transmission, such as cloth masks, sanitizing, and social distancing.
Six-foot distancing was a cornerstone of pandemic policy and, according to former FDA commissioner Scott Gottleib, “probably the single most costly intervention the CDC recommended.” It was also the single biggest obstacle to reopening schools. However, it was not based on data. When pressed by congressional investigators for the basis of the six-foot guidance, former NIAID Director Dr. Anthony Fauci said: “I don't recall. It sort of just appeared.”
Other poorly substantiated claims were made regarding the capacity of vaccines to stop Covid transmission. Even though the vaccine trials had not tested for curbing transmission, public health officials assured Americans that getting vaccinated would protect them from giving Covid to others. CDC Director Rochelle Walensky told MSNBC that “vaccinated people do not carry the virus, don’t get sick.” Dr. Fauci stated that vaccinated people become “dead ends” for the virus. Even after the CDC reported on an outbreak where the virus spread quickly among fully vaccinated people, the Biden administration imposed a vaccine mandate based on the mistaken idea.
“A people who mean to be their own governors” need to ask probing questions and seek balance against one-sided expertise. But reporters and scholars tended to cheerlead rather than critically scrutinize policy. In the spring of 2020, when pandemic shutdowns swept the globe, there was little effort to investigate the evidence base for these unprecedented and extraordinarily costly policies. Had researchers looked to the World Health Organization’s systematic review, just published in November 2019, they would have found that the quality of the scientific evidence in favor of almost all non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) had been rated as “low” or “very low.” Among the measures “not recommended in any circumstances” for a respiratory pandemic were contact tracing, quarantine of exposed individuals, and border closure.
Mainstream outlets published narratives about how NPIs had worked in 1918. But the evidence was weak. In 2006, the Institute of Medicine (now the National Academy of Medicine) convened a distinguished committee to examine the evidence from the 1918 pandemic. The committee concluded that “total mortality was only weakly associated” with the NPIs cities employed to slow the spread of the disease. The committee declined to endorse the use of NPIs in future pandemics because “it is almost impossible to say that the interventions, either individually or in combination, will be effective.”
During the pandemic, academic institutions enthusiastically embraced Covid restrictions. Now that the pandemic is over, there have been surprisingly few retrospectives. But for those who do examine the evidence: it is disappointing. States and countries imposing faster, more stringent, or lengthier Covid restrictions did not fare better.
The simple fact is that we did not know what would work to stop Covid-19. Pandemic policy was made amidst great uncertainty. One can only feel empathy for officials tasked with such heavy responsibility. But under such conditions, those whose authority rests on their information and expertise—health advisors, journalists, and academics—are responsible for doing due diligence and being frank about what they do and do not know with confidence. In retrospect, it seems evident that policy was more often made on the basis of hope than solid evidence.
Too many experts want to blame the public’s loss of trust in institutions on polarization and misinformation. But a fair-minded look back at the pandemic reveals that some loss of trust is both understandable and warranted. A lesson for the future is that the experts on whom democracies rely should not exaggerate what they know.
“A people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives” reads an aphorism from James Madison engraved next to an entrance of the Library of Congress. Madison was surely right, even if libraries may not be the first place people turn. Democracy’s primary truth-seeking institutions are the news media, academia, and scientific agencies. When they function well, they empower the people to better understand their needs and interests and to pursue them effectively.
There are signs that these institutions are not functioning well. All are less trusted than previously. Some of this decline stems from the perception that they are politically biased, with mistrust concentrated on the political right. As educational attainment becomes an increasingly good predictor of people’s political preferences—with the highly educated on the left and the less educated on the right—expert opinion both becomes more left-leaning and more mistrusted on the right.
But having just co-authored a book examining the performance of American democracy during the Covid pandemic, the problems with these institutions are not just a matter of perception. They all overplayed their hands during the pandemic. They leveraged their authority and credentials to steer opinion and behavior. In doing so, they exaggerated their knowledge. As former NIH Director Dr. Francis Collins, to his credit, admitted: “We failed to say every time there was a recommendation, guys, this is the best we can do right now. It’s a good chance this is wrong…. We did not admit our ignorance, and that was a profound mistake.”
“We know what works against Covid-19” was a mantra intoned by public health officials throughout the pandemic. The mantra, however, was wishful thinking. In 2020, officials did not know how Covid was transmitted. Airborne transmission would not be widely acknowledged until 2022. Meanwhile, officials mandated policies premised on droplet transmission, such as cloth masks, sanitizing, and social distancing.
Six-foot distancing was a cornerstone of pandemic policy and, according to former FDA commissioner Scott Gottleib, “probably the single most costly intervention the CDC recommended.” It was also the single biggest obstacle to reopening schools. However, it was not based on data. When pressed by congressional investigators for the basis of the six-foot guidance, former NIAID Director Dr. Anthony Fauci said: “I don't recall. It sort of just appeared.”
Other poorly substantiated claims were made regarding the capacity of vaccines to stop Covid transmission. Even though the vaccine trials had not tested for curbing transmission, public health officials assured Americans that getting vaccinated would protect them from giving Covid to others. CDC Director Rochelle Walensky told MSNBC that “vaccinated people do not carry the virus, don’t get sick.” Dr. Fauci stated that vaccinated people become “dead ends” for the virus. Even after the CDC reported on an outbreak where the virus spread quickly among fully vaccinated people, the Biden administration imposed a vaccine mandate based on the mistaken idea.
“A people who mean to be their own governors” need to ask probing questions and seek balance against one-sided expertise. But reporters and scholars tended to cheerlead rather than critically scrutinize policy. In the spring of 2020, when pandemic shutdowns swept the globe, there was little effort to investigate the evidence base for these unprecedented and extraordinarily costly policies. Had researchers looked to the World Health Organization’s systematic review, just published in November 2019, they would have found that the quality of the scientific evidence in favor of almost all non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) had been rated as “low” or “very low.” Among the measures “not recommended in any circumstances” for a respiratory pandemic were contact tracing, quarantine of exposed individuals, and border closure.
Mainstream outlets published narratives about how NPIs had worked in 1918. But the evidence was weak. In 2006, the Institute of Medicine (now the National Academy of Medicine) convened a distinguished committee to examine the evidence from the 1918 pandemic. The committee concluded that “total mortality was only weakly associated” with the NPIs cities employed to slow the spread of the disease. The committee declined to endorse the use of NPIs in future pandemics because “it is almost impossible to say that the interventions, either individually or in combination, will be effective.”
During the pandemic, academic institutions enthusiastically embraced Covid restrictions. Now that the pandemic is over, there have been surprisingly few retrospectives. But for those who do examine the evidence: it is disappointing. States and countries imposing faster, more stringent, or lengthier Covid restrictions did not fare better.
The simple fact is that we did not know what would work to stop Covid-19. Pandemic policy was made amidst great uncertainty. One can only feel empathy for officials tasked with such heavy responsibility. But under such conditions, those whose authority rests on their information and expertise—health advisors, journalists, and academics—are responsible for doing due diligence and being frank about what they do and do not know with confidence. In retrospect, it seems evident that policy was more often made on the basis of hope than solid evidence.
Too many experts want to blame the public’s loss of trust in institutions on polarization and misinformation. But a fair-minded look back at the pandemic reveals that some loss of trust is both understandable and warranted. A lesson for the future is that the experts on whom democracies rely should not exaggerate what they know.
About the Author
Frances E. Lee
Lee is jointly appointed in the Department of Politics and the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs where she is Professor of Politics and Public Affairs. Lee has broad interests in American politics, with a special focus on congressional politics, national policymaking, party politics, and representation. She is coauthor of In Covid’s Wake: How Our Politics Failed Us (2025), Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation (1999) and the textbook Congress and Its Members (Sage / CQ Press).
About the Author
Frances E. Lee
Lee is jointly appointed in the Department of Politics and the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs where she is Professor of Politics and Public Affairs. Lee has broad interests in American politics, with a special focus on congressional politics, national policymaking, party politics, and representation. She is coauthor of In Covid’s Wake: How Our Politics Failed Us (2025), Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation (1999) and the textbook Congress and Its Members (Sage / CQ Press).
About the Author
Frances E. Lee
Lee is jointly appointed in the Department of Politics and the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs where she is Professor of Politics and Public Affairs. Lee has broad interests in American politics, with a special focus on congressional politics, national policymaking, party politics, and representation. She is coauthor of In Covid’s Wake: How Our Politics Failed Us (2025), Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation (1999) and the textbook Congress and Its Members (Sage / CQ Press).
About the Author
Frances E. Lee
Lee is jointly appointed in the Department of Politics and the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs where she is Professor of Politics and Public Affairs. Lee has broad interests in American politics, with a special focus on congressional politics, national policymaking, party politics, and representation. She is coauthor of In Covid’s Wake: How Our Politics Failed Us (2025), Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation (1999) and the textbook Congress and Its Members (Sage / CQ Press).
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